The Green Standard Army (Chinese: 綠營兵; pinyin: Lǜyíngbīng; Manchu: niowanggiyan turun i kūwaran) was the name of a category of military units under the control of Qing dynasty in China.
[8] The Qing carried out a massive depopulation policy and clearances, forcing people to evacuate the coast in order to deprive Koxinga's Ming loyalists of resources, leading to a myth that it was because Manchus were "afraid of water".
In parts of Southern Fujian, northern Han Bannermen fought for the Qing and, in so doing, disproved the claim that the earlier coastal evacuation, which especially affected the ethnic Tanka people, was ordered by the Manchus out of fear of the water.
[16] Sichuan and southern Shaanxi were retaken in 1680 by the Han Chinese Green Standard Army under Wang Jinbao and Zhao Liangdong, with Manchus only dealing with logistics and provisions.
[20] From the 18th century onwards, the Green Standard Army served primarily as a gendarmerie or constabulary, employed to maintain local law and order and quell small-scale disturbances.
Governors and governors-general each had a battalion of Green Standard troops under their personal command, but their primary duties lay in the judicial and revenue areas rather than coping with invasion or rebellion.
Strictly speaking, the Green Standard Army was not a hereditary force, although the dynasty directed its recruiting efforts primarily at sons and other relatives of serving soldiers.
[21] As early as the White Lotus Rebellion of 1794–1804, the Green Standard armies had begun to exhibit a decline in military effectiveness that rendered them utterly ineffective in combating rebels.
[22] At least eight factors contributed to this decline: (1) soldiers' pay did not rise with inflation, requiring most to seek outside employment to support their families; (2) wide dispersion of posts prevented centralized training while the armies' policing and civic responsibilities left little time for drilling; (3) wartime forces were created by taking small numbers of soldiers from numerous existing units rather than using existing units, breaking up unit cohesion and leading to "divisive influence, poor coordination, and operative inefficiency"; (4) vacancies in the armies' ranks were either left unfilled so officers could pocket the missing soldiers' allowances or fill positions with personal proteges; (5) rampant gambling and opium addictions; (6) the practice of allowing soldiers to hire substitutes, often beggars, to train and fight in their place; (7) infrequent drilling; (8) lax discipline due to a lack of respect for inept officers often appointed due to favoritism or nepotism.