Matt Wrack, the FBU general secretary said, "There clearly are important and difficult questions to ask but they should not be directed at those who do not have the power or authority to have altered policies, operational procedures or training,"[15] The first firefighters and officers to testify were among those who were first to respond, [16][17] followed by others including senior command staff.

Several firefighters reported being in life-threatening situations and felling emotional trauma after being unable to rescue certain residents.

[20] Issues discussed included communications problems,[21] the sheer amount of smoke,[17] the stay put policy that was eventually abandoned,[22] equipment shortages[18][23] and missing fire safety features in the building such as floor plans.

In response to questions about LFB's preparedness, she said the disaster was as unexpected as "a Space Shuttle landing on The Shard."

[26] KCTMO's lawyer said that although the building only had a single stairway "it managed to continue supporting evacuations and firefighting activities throughout the life of the fire" and that expert evidence suggested that 239 people could have got out after seven minutes.

Expert Dr Barbara Lane, had said the stay-put policy effectively failed at 1.23 am, but it was kept in place until 2.37 am when 107 people were still inside; 36 lived.

[27] It was revealed that in July 2014 an official from KCTMO emailed the project team: “We need good costs for Cllr Feilding-Mellen.” At that point £300,000 was removed from the cladding budget and zinc panels were replaced with the aluminium composite material with a plastic core, which the government has now banned from use on high-rise residential blocks.

[27] Martin Seward counsel for the Fire Brigades Union said that the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea had failed to make an evacuation plan for Grenfell Tower and relied on an outdated "stay put" strategy, leaving it to the fire brigade on the ground to devise an evacuation strategy.

[27] Adrian Williamson QC, counsel for the bereaved and survivors, said the evidence revealed “an industry in which Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan were content to push hazardous products into the marketplace and sought to market them dishonestly”.