They applied to a High Court for an order requiring the government to provide them with adequate basic shelter or housing until they obtained permanent accommodation.

In support of their contention that they had complied with the obligation imposed on them by the Constitution,[5] the appellants placed evidence before the court of the legislative and other measures they had adopted concerning housing.

[6] The question of how socio-economic rights were to be enforced, however, was a difficult issue which had to be carefully explored on a case-by-case basis, considering the terms and context of the relevant constitutional provision and its application to the circumstances of the case.

[8][9] The court held further that the state was obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing.

[12] Section 26 as a whole placed at the very least a negative obligation on the state and all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing.

The extent of the state's obligation was defined by three key elements, which had to be considered separately: Reasonable legislative and other measures (such as policies and programs) had to be determined in the light of the fact that the Constitution created different spheres of government and allocated powers and functions amongst these spheres, emphasising their obligation to cooperate with one another in carrying out their constitutional tasks.

A reasonable housing program, capable of facilitating the realisation of the right, had clearly to allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government and ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources were available to implement it.

A reasonable program had to be balanced and flexible, and to make appropriate provision of attention to housing crises and to short- and medium- and long-term needs.

This meant that accessibility had to be progressively facilitated, involving the examination of legal, administrative, operational and financial hurdles which had to be lowered over time.

The consequent pressure on existing settlements resulted in land invasions by those in desperate need, thereby frustrating the attainment of the medium- and long-term objectives of the nationwide housing program.

In particular, the programs adopted by the state fell short of the section's requirements, in that no provision was made for relief to categories of people in desperate need.

This obligation was to devise and implement a coherent and co-ordinated program, designed to provide access to housing, healthcare, sufficient food and water and social security to those unable to support themselves and their dependants.

Through legislation and the common law, the obligation to provide shelter in subsection (1)(c) was imposed primarily on the parents or family and only alternatively on the State.

This included the obligation to devise, fund, implement and supervise measures to provide relief to those in desperate need within its available resources.

[31] The case at hand had brought home "the harsh reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity and equality for all remains for many a distant dream.

The judgment of the court was not to be understood as approving any practice of land invasion for the purpose of coercing the State into providing housing on a preferential basis to those who participate in any exercise of this kind.