Based on new defensive concepts, such as dispersal and concealment, the fortified group was to be, in case of attack, an impassable barrier for French forces.

The scope of protection of the Group Fortification Lorraine was provided by a set of infantry positions, fortified barracks and artillery batteries scattered over a wide area and concealed by the natural topography.

From 1899, the Schlieffen plan of the German General Staff designed the fortifications of the Moselstellung, between Metz and Thionville, to function like a lock for blocking any advance of French troops in case of conflict.

[4] This concept of a fortified line on the Moselle was a significant innovation compared to Système Séré de Rivières developed by the French.

The same day, the troops of General Krause took position on a line from Pagny-sur-Moselle to Mondelange, passing to the west of Metz by Chambley, Mars-la-Tour, Jarny and Briey.

[9] On the morning of September 9, 1944, the American artillery rained shells on identified German positions, paving the way for the infantry and the tanks of Task force McConnell.

The 3rd Battalion of the Task force, in charge of the right flank of the attack, fell on the fortified farmhouse of Moscou,[note 1] a veritable redoubt between the German fortifications, before being taken under heavy fire from Gravelotte.

The 2nd Battalion Task force, which was heading towards Vernéville with relative ease, was finally stopped by gunfire from a sunken road, west of Fort Francis de Guise.

[10] The Colonel of the Roffe 2nd Infantry regiment, whose losses already amounted to 14 officers and 332 men on the morning of September 9, required the air support of General Silvester.

[10] Despite several counter attacks by the 462th Infantry Division, American troops arrived to take over the land in the late afternoon, after a rolling artillery barrage targeting fortifications in the sector, and using smoke shells for cover.

[10] The 1st Battalion Task force, hard hit by the shelling of the 462th Volks-Grenadier-Division and specific small arms fire, had to withdraw with difficulty behind a screen of smoke rockets, more than five hundred meters from Amanvillers.

American bazookas were not effective on the concrete bunkers, and tanks followed by armed flamethrower sections pouncing on the first German lines, neither reaching them, nor neutralizing them, nor taking them.

In the southern sector, 2 Battalion lost 15 officers and 117 men under heavy fire from mortars and automatic weapons, from the buffer strip.

Seeing that the Americans gradually ate away at their lines, the German artillery redoubled its fire, managing to contain the two regiments, and raising fears with General McLain of a new counterattack.

When hostilities resumed after a rainy month, the soldiers of the 462th Volks-Grenadier-Division still held firmly the forts of Metz, though supplies were more difficult under the artillery and the frequent bombings.

[12] As a prelude to the assault on Metz, November 9, 1944, the Air Force sent no less than 1,299 heavy bombers, B-17s and B-24s, to dump 3,753 tons of bombs, and 1,000 to 2,000 books on fortifications and strategic points in the combat zone of IIIrd army.

In the morning mist after an artillery preparation, the strong northern Canrobert line was the first to fall, at around 11:00 am, US troops arriving in the wood Woippy.

On November 16, 1944, while the Americans progressed rapidly in Woippy, the Group Fortification Lorraine, considered a strong defensive position behind the Canrobert line, was evacuated without fighting by troops Kittel.

[16] The objective of the German staff, which was to stall US troops at Metz for the longest possible time before they could reach the front of the Siegfried Line, was largely achieved.