Hamilcar Barca

Hamilcar is the latinization of Hamílkas (Ancient Greek: Ἁμίλκας), the hellenized form of the common Semitic Phoenician-Carthaginian masculine given name ḤMLK (Punic: 𐤇𐤌𐤋𐤊)[1][2] or ḤMLQRT (𐤇𐤌𐤋𐤒𐤓𐤕),[citation needed] meaning "Melqart's brother".

[18] With a small force and no money to hire new troops, Hamilcar's strategic goal probably was to maintain a stalemate, as he had neither the resources to win the war nor the authority to peacefully settle it.

Hamilcar, upon taking command in the summer of 247 BC,[21] punished the rebellious mercenaries (who had revolted because of overdue payments) by murdering some of them at night and drowning the rest at sea,[22] and dismissing many to different parts of northern Africa.

Castellacio, 7 miles north-west of Palermo),[26] and not only maintained himself against all attacks, but carried on with his seaborne raids ranging from Catana[27] in Sicily to as far as Cumae in central Italy.

[30] Hamilcar continued his activities unhindered from his position for another two years, being supplied by road from Drepana,[33] although Carthaginian ships had been withdrawn from Sicily by this time and no naval raids were launched.

[35] The actions of Hamilcar, and his immunity to defeat, plus the stalemate at the siege of Lilybaeum caused the Romans to start building a fleet in 243 BC to seek a decision at sea.

However, the constant skirmishing without ultimate victory may have caused the morale of some of Hamilcar's troops to crack and 1,000 Celtic mercenaries tried to betray the Punic camp to the Romans, which was foiled.

Carthaginian leadership requested terms to the victorious Roman commander, Gaius Lutatius Catulus and authorised Hamilcar Barca to open negotiations, probably to avoid the responsibility of the defeat.

Carthage often hauled defeated generals and admirals before the Tribunal of 100 and had them crucified, so Hamilcar probably distanced himself from the possibility of prosecution if the Roman terms turned out to be harsh enough for Carthaginian authorities to seek a scapegoat.

[42] Lutatius did not press the issue further, and the Carthaginian soldiers were later allowed to leave Sicily under arms with their honor intact,[43] and without any token of submission – a rare gesture granted by the Romans to a defeated enemy.

As the strain on the Punic population increased, Carthaginian authorities then sent them off to Sicca, planning to plead with the whole army to forgo their unpaid wages by pointing out the dire financial situation of Carthage.

[51] Hamilcar's former soldiers, who had been kept together only by his personal authority and by the promise of good pay, broke out into open mutiny[28] once Hanno the Great tried to impose this, and marched on Carthage and encamped at Tunis.

[60] The modern historian Dexter Hoyos stresses that "[s]uch manoeuvres were about the simplest that any army could learn, once it mastered the absolute basics of marching in formation".

Spendius rallied his forces, was reinforced by a detachment largely made of Gauls under Autaritus and shadowed Hamilcar as he advanced south east, keeping to the high ground to avoid Carthaginian elephants and cavalry and harassing their enemy at every possible opportunity.

After the trapped rebels ran out of food, pack animals and cavalry horses and finally resorted to cannibalism, Spendius, Autaritus and Zarzas, accompanied by seven others, went to Hamilcar's camp to seek terms.

Rome, which had dealt with Carthage with all due honor and courtesy during the crisis, going as far as to release all Punic prisoners without ransom and refuse to accept offers from Utica and Rebels mercenaries based in Sardinia to incorporate these territories into the Roman domain, seized Sardinia and Corsica and forced Carthage to pay 1,200 talents for her initial refusal to renounce her claim over the islands.

[73] This probably dealt a fatal blow to any chance of permanent peace between Rome and Carthage[74] and is one of the causes of the Second Punic War and held as the motivation of the subsequent military and political activities of Hamilcar.

Their choice to minimize the Sicilian operations while Hamilcar was in command, reduce the navy and support Hanno the Great's conquests in Africa, all of which were causes for the ultimate defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War.

People disenfranchised by the ruin of the navy and disruption of trade might have thrown in their lot with this group[77] and eventually Hasdrubal the Fair emerged as the leader.

Hamilcar Barca was blamed by the Carthaginian Leaders for causing the Mercenary War by making unrealistic promises to his soldiers, especially the Celts, during his command in Sicily.

Furthermore, Hamilcar allied with Hasdrubal the Fair,[81] his future son in law, to restrict the power of the aristocracy, which was led by Hanno the Great,[82] as well as gain immunity from prosecution.

Hamilcar, on his own responsibility and without the consent of the Carthaginian government,[86] ferried the army across to Gades to start an expedition into Hispania (236 BC), where he hoped to gain a new empire to compensate Carthage for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia.

[28] Iberia would also serve as a base for any future conflicts against the Romans which would be independent of political interference from Carthage, and the campaigns would enhance the reputation of Hamilcar Barca.

Prior to his departure from Carthage, Hamilcar made sacrifices to obtain favorable omens and Hannibal swore never to be a "Friend of Rome" and "Never to show goodwill to the Romans".

In the process, Hamilcar created a professional army of Iberians, Africans, Numidians and other mercenaries that Hasdrubal the Fair would inherit and Hannibal would later lead across the Alps to immortality.

The town, called Helike, is commonly identified with Elche, but given that it is situated close to Hamilcar's base at Akra Leuke from which he could readily draw reinforcement, it cannot be the place where the following events unfolded.

[113] It is possible that Hamilcar died battling the Vettoni, who lived across the Tagus west of Toledo and to the north of Turduli and northwest of Oretani territory.

According to Appian, Hamilcar was thrown from his horse and drowned in a river,[117] but Polybius says he fell in battle in an unknown corner of Iberia against an unnamed tribe.

[121] Hamilcar stood out far above the Carthaginians of his age in military and diplomatic skill and in strength of patriotism; in these qualities he was surpassed only by his son Hannibal, whom he may have imbued with his own deep suspicion of Rome and trained to be his successor in the conflict.

[123] By the power of his personal influence among the mercenaries and the surrounding African peoples, superior strategy and some luck,[28] as well as cooperation, if unenthusiastic, from Hanno the Great, Hamilcar crushed the revolt by 237 BC amid a war marked with cruel atrocities from both sides.