President Abraham Lincoln Vice President Alexander H. Stephens Assistant Secretary of War John A. Campbell The Hampton Roads Conference was a peace conference held between the United States and representatives of the unrecognized breakaway Confederate States on February 3, 1865, aboard the steamboat River Queen in Hampton Roads, Virginia, to discuss terms to end the American Civil War.

[2] Blair had advocated to Lincoln that the war could be brought to a close by having the two opposing sections of the nation stand down in their conflict, and reunite on grounds of the Monroe Doctrine in attacking the French-installed Emperor Maximilian I of Mexico.

[6] By 1864, Stephens had thoroughly lost faith in Davis's leadership, and accepted an invitation by General William T. Sherman to discuss independent peace negotiations between the State of Georgia and the federal Union.

Campbell served earlier on the Supreme Court of the United States from 1853 to 1861, but began to consider resignation after Abraham Lincoln's first inaugural address in March 1861.

On March 15, Campbell relayed to Martin Jenkins Crawford a supposed promise from Secretary of State Seward that the federal government would evacuate Fort Sumter within five days.

Campbell declined a number of positions in the CSA government, but accepted the post of Assistant Secretary of War in President Davis' cabinet in 1862.

In an 1865 letter to Judge Benjamin R. Curtis, he described the disastrous state of the Confederacy and marveled: "You would suppose there could be no difficulty in convincing men under such circumstances that peace was required.

The Republican platform in 1864 had explicitly endorsed abolition; but pushing too hard on the slavery issue might offend mainstream politicians and voters.

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of Slavery, and which comes by and with authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.Lincoln confided to James W. Singleton that his primary concern was the Union.

[...] If questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in constitutional and lawful channels.

[26] At Blair's suggestion, Davis proposed having Generals Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant meet as representatives of their respective governments;[26] Lincoln refused.

Mr. Stephens supposed Blair to be "the mentor of the Administration and Republican party.The Union Congress was shaken by the news of possible Confederate peace negotiations in late January, just days before a rescheduled Thirteenth Amendment vote.

)[35] Reassurance from Lincoln's secretary John Hay was not convincing to Ohio Democrat Sunset Cox who demanded that Ashley investigate the rumor of impending negotiations.

[25][42] Stephens discussed the topic of a military alliance against France in Mexico, but Lincoln cut him off and asked directly about the question of sovereignty.

Regarding the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln reportedly interpreted it as a war measure that would permanently affect only the 200,000 people who came under Army protection during the War—but noted that the Courts might feel differently.

[44][45] Seward reportedly showed the Confederates a copy of the newly adopted Thirteenth Amendment, referred to this document also as a war measure,[46] and suggested that if they were to rejoin the Union they might be able to prevent its ratification.

[3][47] After further discussion, Lincoln suggested that the Southern states might "avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation" by ratifying the Amendment "prospectively, so as to take effect—say in five years.

[19] That Lincoln proposed a delayed ratification plan is mentioned by the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel in June 1865—based on a report by Stephens from after the meeting.

[54] From a legal standpoint, Lincoln never believed that the federal government had the authority to ban slavery in the states—thus his constant emphasis on the status of the Emancipation Proclamation as a measure effective only during wartime.

[57] The Confederate delegates spread word of this suggestion privately, contradicting Jefferson Davis's public statements that the surrender terms had been unconscionable.

"[59] Vorenberg suggests that although Lincoln might have expressed his preference for "gradual emancipation", he would not have sought to portray this option as legally or politically possible.

"[61] According to David Herbert Donald, Lincoln and Seward may have offered olive branches to the Confederates based on their sense that the institution of slavery was doomed and would end regardless.

[48] Ludwell H. Johnson theorizes that peace negotiations reflected Lincoln's efforts to consolidate political power by creating "a new conservative coalition which would include Southerners".

[68] Lincoln followed through on his promise to pursue compensation, requesting amnesty and $400,000,000 for the Southern states if they ended armed resistance and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment.

[70] The resolution stipulated that the Confederacy would receive $200,000,000 if it ceased "resistance to national authority" before April 1, 1865, and $200,000,000 more for successful ratification of the Thirteenth amendment before July 1, 1865.

[49][71][72] The New York Herald reported that Seward had been seeking a peace agreement in order to bolster a new coalition of conservative Republicans and Democrats; "that Secretary Seward seized upon the movement to secure whatever éclat there might be connected with it, in hopes that if peace was the result he would be able to ride upon the wave of joy of a grateful people, and thus become the standard bearer of the great conservative party in 1868.

)[74] Campbell continued to push a peace settlement within the CSA, writing to John C. Breckinridge on March 5 that "The South may succomb [sic.]

[81] The Lincoln film scenes focus on the slavery aspect and the desire of the Confederates to block adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment if re-admitted to the Union.