Hellenistic armies

Initially, the Hellenistic armies were very similar to those commanded by Alexander the Great, but during the era of the Epigonoi (Ἐπίγονοι, "Successors") the differences became obvious, with the Diadochi growing to favor large masses of soldiers rather than smaller, well-trained ones, and weight was valued over maneuverability.

The limited availability of Greek conscripts in the east led to an increasing dependence on mercenary forces, whereas the Hellenistic armies in the west were continuously involved in wars, which soon exhausted local manpower, paving the way for Roman supremacy in the region.

[2] To take another example, by the mid-third century BCE, the Spartan citizen population had decreased to a tiny fraction of what it had been at the time of the Persian Wars (Cleomenes' army could only field about 5,000 men[3]).

In 227 BCE, Cleomenes cancelled all debts, pooled and divided the large estates and increased the citizen body by enfranchising 5,000 Perioikoi and 'metics' (resident foreigners).

Before long, he increased the citizen body further by allowing Helots to buy their freedom for five minae and therefore he "acquired 500 talents, some of which he used to arm 2,000 men in the Macedonian fashion as phalangites".

[4] However, the defeat at Sellasia in 222 BCE and the attendant great loss of manpower forced a reliance on mercenary soldiers, who were the basis of power for Machanidas and Nabis, his successors.

Their soldiers (known as phalangites) ranged from professional warriors, drilled in tactics, weapon use and formation, typically of Greek origin; to trained, non-Greek villagers, as was the case in the army of Ptolemy Philopator, the victor of Raphia.

Certain reforms in the weight of the phalangite equipment and the conscription methods used turned the phalanx from a maneuverable formation into a bulky, slow-moving steam roller, whose charge no enemy was able to withstand.

Maneuvers like the fake retreat of Phillip II at Chaeronea or the oblique advance of Alexander at Arbela were never again attempted, but, as long as the phalanx remained on relatively level terrain and its flanks were kept secure, it was not conquered by any other formation.

Helmets ranged from simple, open-faced affairs to stylized Thracian models (complete with mask-like cheek protectors that often imitated a human face).

It was secured by both a shoulder harness and a forearm brace, allowing the off-hand to release the hand grip and make wielding the enormous sarissa pike possible.

The Roman victories of Magnesia, Cynoscephalae and Pydna were won by armies that included thousands of non-Roman (often Hellenic) cavalry, elephants, as well as assorted heavy and light infantry.

But Ptolemy IV Philopator and his ministers reformed the army in order to keep up manpower by allowing the native Egyptian warrior class, the Machimoi, into the phalanx.

[25] The true extent of the adoption of Roman techniques is unknown; some have suggested that the infantry are in fact more likely to be Thureophoroi or Thorakitai, troops armed with an oval shield of the Celtic type, a thrusting spear and javelins.

In this sense, we can only assume that the Hellenistic kingdoms did reform and re-organize their troops in some regards along Roman lines, but these appear to be superficial at best and quite possibly the result of convergent evolution, with both cultures influencing each other.

This may well be due to over-campaigning, high casualties or even because many of the Macedonian noblemen who formed much of the heavy cavalry of Philip II and Alexander went east and never came back.

Cataphracts were introduced to the Hellenistic world by the Seleucids in the late 3rd century BC and are attested to have also been used, probably as a lighter version and for a very limited time, by the Kingdom of Pergamon.

Antiochus III was able to field an extraordinary 6,000 men at Magnesia, the first testimony of cavalry gaining victory over the closed ordered ranks of a competent infantry, yet to no avail.

According to Arrian, when Alexander faced the Indian tribe of the Malli, he did not dare assault them with his, by now, veteran Heteroi or Thessalians, but he followed the customary cavalry tactics of attacks and retreats (perispasmoi).

Their tradition was carried on in the Hellenistic times and troops similarly armed were called doratophoroi or xystophoroi (both terms translated as lance bearers or plainly lancers).

The writings of historians, from Arrian to Appian, detail numerous tribes, nations, and ethnic groups—Dahae, Mysians, Scythians, etc.—from whom Hellenistic rulers recruited such warriors.

From the Greek tactical manuals we learn that Tarantines is the collective name of the lightly armored cavalry, which was equipped with javelins and lance, that first skirmishes with the enemy and then charges.

Their value against any opponent or commander of notable skill was very low as was already proven by the Ten Thousand (the Greek mercenaries with whom Xenophon served) at Cunaxa and Alexander in Arbela.

Their use is considered more harmful than beneficial in the Greek tactical manuals, yet they could have a frightening effect on badly trained, inexperienced opponents, such as Asiatic tribal armies.

[38] War elephants were considered unreliable by Greek military writers and thinkers, but played an important role in many battles of the Hellenistic era, especially in the east.

War elephants were typically fitted with a tower on their back that housed several soldiers armed with sarissae and projectiles (arrows or javelins) to unload on the enemy.

[42] Philip V of Macedon used artillery, in conjunction with defensive field works, in his defence of the Aous Valley in the Second Macedonian War, inflicting high casualties on the Roman side.

Perseus of Macedon used artillery in the Third Macedonian War to defend the Elpeus river from Aemilius Paulus, who did indeed move away to seek another route around this defensive line.

Pyrrhus countered the Roman legions by using a mixed phalanx formation of pikemen, spearmen and elephants, an array that proved successful in all battles against them, regardless of his "more than average" losses.

The battle of Sellasia was also peculiar, in reality being more of an assault against a static enemy, a fact that enabled Antigonus to effectively launch a series of separate attacks.