Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine (12 December 1838 – 22 January 1879) was an administrator and commander in the British Army in the Cape Frontier and Anglo-Zulu Wars.

[4] The 1st Battalion of the 24th Regiment comprised the main infantry component of Lord Chelmsford's Number 3 Column, which had crossed into Zululand on 11 January.

In accordance with his original vision of the campaign, his intention was to bring the enemy to battle, ending the war quickly by destroying the Zulu force in a set-piece engagement.

The arrival of Durnford's column in mid morning added a British rocket troop, two additional companies of the NNC and about 200 native irregular cavalry; some 500 men all told.

[7] With the developing Zulu threat becoming increasingly apparent, Durnford's arrival created some confusion as to the camp's command arrangements.

However, the discovery of the Zulu main body by a cavalry patrol, possibly combined with the Zulus' realisation that the British had divided their army and the eagerness of the younger warriors, precipitated a full-scale attack on the camp.

[11] The terrain at Isandlwana, consisting of tall grass and ravines, called Dongas, into which the advancing Zulus periodically disappeared, shielded the movements of the Zulu army from view of the British.

Even had Pulleine managed to effect an orderly withdrawal at this stage, there was no easily defensible position for him to retreat to, since the Isandlwana camp was not fortified, nor were the wagons laagered.

The Zulus overran the camp, eradicating any survivors who tried to make a stand, and chasing stragglers as far as the Buffalo River before overtaking and killing them.

In his version, once it became clear the battle was lost, Pulleine ordered Melvill to attempt to escape with the colour before retiring to his tent, possibly to write a letter to his family, or alternatively to sketch a report of the defeat for Chelmsford.

'[17] This version of events would explain why Durnford was apparently unable to locate Pulleine once his force returned to the camp as the rout began.

Furthermore, in his memoir A Lost Legionary in South Africa, Commandant George Hamilton Browne describes coming across and saluting Pulleine's corpse on his way back from visiting his tent on the morning of the 23rd.

[22] The former was of particular significance since it would have provided a much clearer signal to Chelmsford that the camp was in real trouble, and may have induced him to hurry back in time to rescue the situation.

This is however unfair, since Chelmsford's original order, recovered from Crealock's order book on the field, contains no specific reference to ‘taking command.’[23] Because of this, Durnford acted with considerable freedom in making what was ultimately a mistaken decision to go on the offensive, and in this regard Pulleine's reluctance to commit any of the 24th's infantry companies to Durnford's advance was sound.