History of foreign relations of China
Main points of China's foreign policy during this period: Following 1949: By the mid 19th century, Chinese stability had come under increasing threat from both domestic and international sources.
China was required to accept diplomats at the capital in Peking, provided for the free movement for foreign ships in Chinese rivers, kept its tariffs low, and opened the interior to Christian missionaries.
Manchu leaders of the Qing government found the treaties useful, because they forced the foreigners into a few limited areas, so that the vast majority of Chinese had no contact whatsoever with them or their dangerous ideas.
Japan moved to dominate the Korean Empire (and annexed it in 1910)[7] and seized the Ryukyus;[8] France took Vietnam;[9] Britain took Burma[10] and Nepal; Russia took parts of Siberia.
[15] In long-term perspective, the major impact of the missions was not the thousands of converts out of million of people, but introducing modern medical standards, and especially building schools for the few families eager to learn about the outside world.
Russia, taking the self-appointed mantle of protector of China, worked with Germany and France to intervene and forced Japan to withdraw from Liaodong Peninsula.
In 1898 Russia obtained a 25-year lease over the Liadong Peninsula in southern Manchuria, including the ice free harbor of Port Arthur, their only such facility in the East.
[47] In 1938, Chiang Kai-Shek's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a "Map of National Shame" which listed Mongolia, parts of Siberia, and Indochina as "lost territories.
[49] The Imperial German Navy was in charge of Germany's Jiaozhou Bay Leased Territory, and spent heavily to set up modern facilities that would be a showcase for Asia.
There were delays and the "Flying Tigers" under Claire Lee Chennault finally became operational days after the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) brought the U.S. into the war officially.
[57] The perception grew that Chiang's government, with poorly equipped and ill-fed troops was unable to effectively fight the Japanese or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
One recent scholar argues that the Communists won the Civil War because Mao Zedong made fewer military mistakes and Chiang Kai-shek antagonized key interest groups.
[69]: 9 People's diplomacy with the capitalist countries sought to cultivate informal, non-state ties in the hope of developing "foreign friends" who would lobby their governments to improve relations with China.
[70]: 21 In their view, the primary concern of worldwide revolutionary activities should be anti-imperialism, and the economic development brought by socialism would result in a shift in the global balance of power.
[48]: 175 With Mao in overall control and making final decisions, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai handled foreign-policy and developed a strong reputation for his diplomatic and negotiating skills.
[70]: 21 Mao described Africa and Latin America as the "First Intermediate Zone," in which China's status as a non-white power might enable it to compete with and supersede both United States and Soviet Union influence.
[80]: 48 After its founding, the PRC's foreign policy initially focused on its solidarity with the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc nations, and other communist countries, sealed with, among other agreements, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950 to oppose China's chief antagonists, the West and in particular the U.S.
After the conclusion of the Korean War, China sought to balance its identification as a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and other Third World countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.
Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and clashes in 1969 on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic position.
[86]: 165 A visit by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka to Beijing culminated in the signing of a joint statement on September 29, 1972, and normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC.
[48]: 175–176 Deng's approach attempted to build broad consensus and required enormous efforts to achieve compromises acceptable to all relevant stakeholders on an issue.
[48]: 175–176 This decentralized approach led to consideration of a great number of interests and views, but also fragmentation of policy institutions and extensive bargaining between different bureaucratic units during the policy-making process.
[87] To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.
[48]: 55 On 25 December 1978, Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea, overrunning most of the country, deposing the Khmer Rouge regime favored by China, and installing Heng Samrin as the head of the new Cambodian government.
[48]: 67 In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, various countries imposed sanctions, cancelled aid, banned sales of military equipment, or cut back diplomatic ties.
[93] In the post-Cold War environment, CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin continued Deng's good neighboring policy, under the principles of stabilizing the periphery, expanding diplomacy, and altering the situation.
[48]: 69 To combat the threat of militant Islam-fueled separatism in Xinjiang and to cement relations with the Central Asian states following the Soviet Union's dissolution, China signed the 1996 Treaty of Enhancing Military Mutual Trust in the Border Areas with nearby Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan at a meeting in Shanghai.
In July 1993, the Yinhe incident prompted Jiang's adoption of the "sixteen-characters formula" for working with the United States: "enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation.
[48]: 63 Although China denied the allegation, the United States unilaterally cut off the Yinhe's GPS, causing it to lose direction and forcing it to anchor on the high seas for twenty-four days.
Deeming the importance of the bilateral relationship too great to be harmed by the embassy bombing, CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin sought to calm the Chinese public outrage.
