[2] This derivative suit dragged on, and President John Adams announced on January 8, 1798 that the Eleventh Amendment was ratified.
So, the first main issue in the case became whether the Eleventh Amendment was valid, not having been presented to the President for approval or veto.
Here is the full text of the Court's opinion:[1] The Court, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered an unanimous opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.In oral argument, Justice Samuel Chase had stated that the president "has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution".
[1] The clarity of this language in Article V has been cited as a reason why the Court did not think that further explanation of its decision was needed.
There the Court held Presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority.
We also note that the Court's holding in Hollingsworth, supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to two alternative protections.
[11] In 1800, Justice Chase implied that neither Hollingsworth nor Todd involved any unconstitutional federal statute:[12] It is indeed a general opinion—it is expressly admitted by all this bar and some of the judges have, individually in the circuits decided, that the Supreme Court can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and therefore invalid, but there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point.Assuming that Chase was correct, then perhaps Marbury v. Madison was the first such case.
[8][14] Tillman did not suggest that Hollingsworth was wrongly decided, but only that its scope (as originally understood) might have been narrower than commonly thought today.
[3] Moreover, Tillman argued that there were several other grounds potentially explaining the Court's decision, including: that the proposed Eleventh Amendment was in fact delivered to George Washington, he declined to sign it, and Washington's non-signature did not amount to a pocket veto because Congress remained in session.
Lee did not advance the alternative theory that the Eleventh Amendment was valid because George Washington declined to veto it.
And once Chase had opened discussion distinguishing the proposition of amendments (by Congress) and their adoption (by the States), the parties were on notice that these issues were important to the Court.
Historian David E. Kyvig has argued that the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth adopted the position put forward by Attorney General Lee, although Kyvig published that argument several years prior to the 2005 article in the Texas Law Review.
However, Kyvig does not explain which of Lee's specific arguments were adopted by the Court or how the language in the Court's opinion explains the primary issue in the case: the scope of Article V and the scope of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 and the interplay (if any) between the two provisions.