Howze Board
McNamara bypassed Secretary of the Army Elvis Jacob Stahr Jr., in what many considered a slap in the face, to conduct a review "in an atmosphere divorced from traditional viewpoints and past policies."
McNamara directed Lieutenant general Hamilton H. Howze, the Army's first director of aviation, to conduct a review of the tactical possibilities suggested by the Rogers study.
Before the Howze Board "the Caribou and the Mohawk were the two major symbols of Army-Air Force disagreement and more time was devoted to these systems than to the entire mobility concept itself.
McNamara's memo also named the individuals he wished to conduct this review, giving the Secretary of the Army no room to place his own appointees.
[4] I shall be disappointed if the Army's reexamination merely produces logistically oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for employment of fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility.
Its eventual membership consisted of 240 military personnel and 53 civilians, not counting those assigned to troop tests, operational analysis, and war gaming.
These groups were formed around areas specifically mentioned in McNamama's memo, and were given a great deal of latitude when it came to their actual work.
The greatest constraint was time: the board was slated to report its findings to McNamara by 1 September, leaving about six weeks for testing and evaluation.
[16] The report was a large document (two inches thick according to one source)[17] containing a number of recommendations in keeping with McNamara's original charge.
The centerpiece of the report were a number of proposed organizations that would make maximum use of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that were either in the Army's existing inventory or under development.
The Air Cavalry Combat Brigade was intended to "rely on aerial firepower" and operate in either an anti-armor or counterinsurgency role.
"[20]The Air Force, which had been a major part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's strategic vision, reacted strongly to the findings of the Howze Board.
Left unsaid was the fact that airmobility would be expensive, and the Air Force also feared a reduction in their portion of the defense budget and the resulting cancellation of programs.
Over the next two years, Kinnard's division conducted a number of exercises and maneuvers to demonstrate that airmobility was practical and flexible enough to meet the vision of the board's final report.
The Air Cavalry Combat Brigade idea was never officially tested, although an improvised version did operate for a limited time in 1971 in South Vietnam.
