Although 100 F-11s were ordered in 1943, the program was delayed beyond the end of World War II, rendering the aircraft surplus to USAAF requirements; the production contract was canceled and only two prototypes were completed.

[7] Hughes Aircraft Company founder Howard Hughes had first promoted the D-2 as a "pursuit type airplane", (i.e. a fighter aircraft),[8][9] but it lacked both the maneuverability of a fighter and the load-carrying capacity of bomber, and could not accommodate required military equipment; additionally, the USAAF Air Materiel Command (AMC) objected to its wooden Duramold construction due to a perceived lack of durability under fire.

[10][11] Hughes campaigned the USAAF in Washington, enlisting his father's friend, Secretary of Commerce Jesse Holman Jones, who met with President Franklin Roosevelt in June 1942 to discuss the project.

[12] However, around this time, USAAF leaders were debating the need for a dedicated, purpose-designed reconnaissance aircraft with greater capabilities than existing converted fighters and bombers.

On August 20, Roosevelt submitted a report to General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, recommending the Hughes proposal.

Warned that the USAAF was considering canceling the F-11 due to a lack of progress, Hughes hired Charles Perrell, former vice president of production at Consolidated Vultee, to manage the program, promising him full and unconditional control.

[21] Perrell found Hughes Aircraft rife with inefficiency and suffering from a "complete lack of experience in the design and construction of airplanes in general."

[23] By this time, Perrell had been successful in reforming the program, but there was no longer any impetus to deliver 98 production aircraft, and Hughes returned from self-imposed exile and began to interfere despite his earlier promises not to do so.

[25] The XF-11 emerged as a tricycle landing gear, twin-engine, twin-boom all-metal monoplane with a pressurized central crew nacelle and a much larger wingspan and higher aspect ratio than the P-38 or the D-2.

Unlike the competing Republic XF-12, the XF-11 had no provisions for developing films in flight, for mounting trimetrogon cameras (used for studying topography), nor for dropping flash bombs for nighttime missions.

Fitting trimetrogon cameras to the production F-11 was considered; however, due to the lack of provisions for flash bombs, the USAAF intended to restrict the F-11 to daytime missions only.

[31][a] The first XF-11 prototype was equipped with a pair of dual four-bladed, variable-pitch, contra-rotating Hamilton Standard propellers;[23][30] these proved troublesome in testing, having a tendency to suddenly and inexplicably reverse pitch.

On 24 April, the aircraft was briefly flown at an altitude of 20 ft (6.1 m) over the runway, but the company decided to wait for replacement propellers before initiating formal test flights.

[35] Hydraulic fluid for the right-hand propeller had to be refilled repeatedly after preflight engine tests, but since all systems seemed to be working properly and no leak was observed, Hughes decided to proceed.

[39] He initiated a forced landing on the golf course of the Los Angeles Country Club, but about 300 yards (270 m) short of the course, the aircraft suddenly lost altitude and clipped three houses in Beverly Hills.

[3][33][40][41][42][43] USAAF investigators concluded that, "It appeared that loss of hydraulic fluid caused failure of the pitch change mechanism of right rear propeller.

It was Wright Field's understanding that the crash was attributed to pilot error,"[44] yet Hughes successfully brought suit against Hamilton Standard for the malfunctioning contra-rotating blades in the right propeller.

[45][46][b] The USAAF demanded that the aircraft be trucked from Culver City to Muroc Dry Lake for the flight, fearing the repercussions of another crash in a populated area.

[54] The committee revealed that John Meyer had spent $169,661 (equivalent to $2,987,339 in 2023) entertaining Elliott Roosevelt and other USAAF officers overseeing reconnaissance aircraft procurement.

[56] Howard Hughes subsequently testified before the committee and is generally thought to have successfully deflected criticism of his company's alleged mismanagement of the F-11 and H-4 contracts.