Human Terrain System
The Human Terrain System (HTS) was a United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) support program employing personnel from the social science disciplines – such as archaeology, anthropology, sociology, political science, historians, regional studies, and linguistics – to provide military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population (i.e. the "human terrain") in the regions in which they were deployed.
[1][2][3][4][5] The concept of HTS was first developed in a paper by Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson in 2005,[6] which proposed a pilot version of the project as a response to "identified gaps in [US military] commanders' and staffs' understanding of the local population and culture", such as became particularly visible during the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.
[10][11][12] Following the publication of a report on HTS by the Commission on Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Services (CEAUSSIC) in 2009,[13][14] the AAA released a further statement of disapproval, which they re-iterated in 2012 after rumours that the controversy had died down.
[21]: 15 According to Roberto J. Gonzalez (Associate Professor of Anthropology at San Jose State University, and one of the most vocal critics of HTS), this concept can be traced back to a 1968 report by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) about "the perceived threat of the Black Panthers and other militant groups".
In a 2005 article, Montgomery McFate (HTS's Senior Social Scientist from 2007 to 2010, and an anthropologist by training) argued that anthropology was born as a "warfighting discipline", having served in its early history as "the handmaiden of colonialism".
[5] In July 2005, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) initiated an HTS pilot project (named Cultural Operations Research – Human Terrain System, or COR-HTS), which was headed up by Captain Don Smith, and housed at the Training and Doctrine Command in Fort Leavenworth.
[3] However, in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) from Central Command issued in April 2007, calling for an HTS Team in every Army Brigade and Marine Corps Regiment in Iraq and Afghanistan,[30] the US Defense Secretary, Robert M. Gates, authorized a $40 million expansion of the program in September 2007.
[3] McFate and Fondacaro referred to this as a "catastrophic success", meaning that "while the boost from the DOD (Department of Defense) was gratifying, fulfilling the mandate would stretch a new organization to the limit".
As part of the ongoing drawdown from Afghanistan in 2013–2014, the Army programmed HTS funding to drop proportionately, eliminating human terrain teams as units were removed from theater.
During a 15-day operation in the late summer of 2007, 500 Afghan and 500 US soldiers were deployed to clear an estimated 200 to 250 Taliban insurgents out of Paktia Province, secure southeastern Afghanistan's most important road, and halt a string of suicide attacks on US troops and local governors.
During the operation, an HTS anthropologist, Tracy St. Benoit,[citation needed] identified an unusually high concentration of widows in poverty, creating pressure on their sons to join the well-paid insurgents.
[43] Stars and Stripes reported that in one Pashtun village, Kuz Khadokhel, the Human Terrain Team (HTT) made it possible for negotiator Captain Aaron White to understand body language in the context of the culture, to identify leaders during negotiations, and to reinforce a perception of leadership by not conferring with fellow officers and by demonstrating good faith through projects facilitated by the Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which included roads, a visit by the PRT's mobile medical clinic, the construction of a deep well for irrigation, and the beginnings of a road to Afghanistan's main Highway 1.
[45]: 17 [46][47] Nicole Suveges, a member of HTT IZ3, was killed on 24 June 2008, along with 11 other soldiers, Iraqi government officials and United States Embassy personnel when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City.
[60] SSRA is responsible for liaising with indigenous polling organizations and small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to gather data and information from the local population.
[31][32] Components in the toolkit include: ANTHROPAC, UCINET, Axis PRO, i2 Analyst's Notebook, and TerraExplorer, a 3D earth visualization application provided by Skyline Software Systems.
In a 2007 article on HTS in the New York Times, David Rohde, an American journalist who has twice won the Pulitzer Prize, reported that one of the first HTTs to be deployed in Afghanistan had received "lavish" praise from officers for "helping them see the situation from an Afghan perspective and allowing them to cut back on combat operations".
[12] Michael Bhatia, an embedded anthropologist who was killed whilst serving in Afghanistan, contended that "some academics have created a polemical enemy image rather than actually learning what HTS does".
[71] In 2006, George Packer, author of The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq and New Yorker magazine staff writer, wrote an article about the increasing use of social science in US military operations and the early trials of the HTS program.
[45]: 15 When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment – all characteristic features of the HTS concept and its application – it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology.
[10][11][12] The statement argued that HTS personnel would have responsibilities to the U.S. military working in war zones that would conflict with anthropologists' duty, as outlined in the AAA Code of Ethics (Section III, A, 1), to "do no harm to those they study".
[11] It further maintained that, working in a war zone, HTS personnel would be unable to ensure the "voluntary informed consent (without coercion)" of those whom they communicate with, as is also required by the AAA Code of Ethics (Section III, A, 4).
[11] In December 2008, the AAA Executive Board followed up their initial statement of disapproval by asking the Commission on Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Services (CEAUSSIC) to thoroughly review the HTS program.
[73] It also noted that if HTS were a research organization, "it would be required to comply with federal law for subject protection" and suggested that it was "unusual" that the program had avoided oversight by an Institutional Review Board (IRB).
[29] In conclusion, the report stated: "When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment – all characteristic features of the HTS concept and its application – it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology".
[78] In April 2008, a conference was held at the University of Chicago to address the growing controversy around the HTS program and situate it in a global, longue durée context of knowledge production and power relations.
Many of the papers presented at the conference were later published in a book edited by John D. Kelly, Beatrice Jauregui, Sean T. Mitchell, and Jeremy Walton, titled Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency (University of Chicago Press, 2010).
[85][86][87] In the same year, Matt Tompkins, an HTT Leader, remarked that defense contractors supporting HTS were not providing sufficient training or staffing, and that the social scientists on his team lacked region-specific expertise.
The NDU team concluded that had soldiers themselves been the primary sensors on the ground, as recommended in LTG Michael T. Flynn's Fixing Intel monograph, HTTs would have better been able to perform the role they were originally intended to serve.
Ann Marlowe wrote a piece about HTS for the Weekly Standard in November 2007, stating that "there are some things the Army needs in Afghanistan, but more academics are not at the top of the list.
[94] The film features interviews with numerous individuals who have played an important role in the history of HTS and the public debate surrounding the program, including Michael Bhatia, Steve Fondacaro, Roberto Gonzalez, Hugh Gusterson, and Montgomery McFate.
