The battle had long been the focus of propaganda in the history of Chinese Communist Party but had become Peng Dehuai's "crime" during the Cultural Revolution.

There was also a general sentiment among the anti-Japanese resistance forces, particularly in the Kuomintang, that the Communists were contributing too little to the war effort and that they were interested only in expanding their power base.

It was out of these circumstances that the Communists planned to stage a great offensive to prove that they were contributing to the war effort and to mend relations.

By 1940, growth was so impressive that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regulars (46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th) against the Japanese-held cities and the railway lines linking them.

[12] They succeeded in blowing up bridges and tunnels and ripping up track, and went on for the rest of September to attack Japanese garrisons frontally.

About 600 mi (970 km) of railways were destroyed, and the Jingxing coal mine, which was important to the Japanese war industry, was rendered inoperative for six months.

However, from October to December, the Japanese responded in force, reasserting control of railway lines and conducting aggressive "mopping up operations" in the rural areas around them.

After the establishment of the People's Republic, Mao is alleged to have said to Lin Biao that "allowing Japan to occupy more territory is the only way to love your country.

[20] During the Great Leap Forward, Peng's opposition to Mao's policies led to his downfall and then the launching of the battle became yet again a criminal action in the Cultural Revolution.

In 1967, the Red Guard group of Tsinghua University, with the support of the Central Cultural Revolution Committee, issued a leaflet saying, "The rogue Peng, along with Zhu De, launched the offensive to defend Chongqing and Xi'an...

'"[21] Peng admitted in his autobiography that he had ordered the launch in late July without awaiting the green light from the Central Military Committee and that he regretted it.

"[24] It was a successful campaign, but Mao later attributed it as the main provocation for the devastating Japanese Three Alls Policy later and used it to criticize Peng at the Lushan Conference.