German and Keller possibly introduced the term in 2009, describing it as "an institutional arrangement governing the interdependencies among discrete property holders and regimes".
Theoretical discussions have highlighted a distinction between formal (laws, official rules, contracts, standards, procedures) and informal (shared values, behavioural norms, belief systems, codes of conduct, discourses) institutions.
Institutions are seen as key actors in guiding the political process, and are shaped by historical struggles, rules and procedures; rather than being merely the aggregation of individual motives.
[12] Where cooperation is limited, and not enshrined within official documents or a specific policy or contract (loose, informal institutionalisation), the hybrid can be said to be weak.
For instance global air travel consists of public, private and hybrid airline operators (single entity).
Quangos also serve to demonstrate the neoliberal context within which the changes in institutional configurations are taking place (the ‘rolling back’ of the state and a more prominent role for the market).
Moreover, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and its predecessor the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (considered below), hybrids operating between science and politics, were first established over two decades ago.
Although the partnerships have been criticised, a common criticism both of the Type IIs and multilateral policy more generally is the “minimal degree of institutionalisation”[24] seen.
This serves to promote strong hybrid institutions as a potential solution to the low “implementation record of [...] multilateral partnerships”.
The Strategy contains agreements on biotrade, technological development for conservation and eco-finance, a “set of intersected [issues] that have been deadlocked at the governmental level by competing interests and power inequalities”.
By having clear and transparent strategies, policy documents, and reporting procedures, hybrid institutions can ensure their legitimacy and accountability.
It consists of over 2000 scientists representing 154 countries, and was “conceived as an explicitly hybrid institution capable of producing a political consensus around scientific knowledge concerning the global climate”[30] (emphasis added).
[31] As with the partnerships discussed previously, the importance of achieving both a balance of input from different sectors, and rules which shape outcomes is evident; demonstrating need for strong, genuinely hybrid institutions.
The quota rule which requires both north and south inputs for each chapter was introduced in response to criticism that the reports were western-centric.
This argument reflects a wider critique of institutions as being the product of traditional power structures that perpetuate existing inequalities.
[38] PPL, whose involvement in funding the Dolly project was driven by potential commercial applications, was originally a ‘spin-off’ from the Roslin Institute.
Again, the neoliberal context is evident here, with state-funded entities having to engage with the private sector and demonstrate economic worthiness to maintain legitimacy.
Stockholm syndrome, whereby hostages develop loyalty to their captors, is used to describe a scenario where the need for private funding jeopardises the neutrality of the research process in favour of a particular clients’ perspective.
Lima syndrome, whereby the captors develop an attachment to their hostages, applies where research bodies lose sight of their role in contributing to society and becoming preoccupied with esoteric academic debates.
The proposal is that the combining technical and enforcement capacity of the state, the legal certainty of ownership, and the successful principles of self-organisation may help govern responses where property regimes are contentious or overlap, or where issues exist that do not respect discrete regimes of resource tenure (for example pests, weeds, or watercourse pollution).
For instance, a great deal of political faith is being placed on hybrid institutions for tackling climate change in the form of carbon markets.
Even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which avoids prescriptive policy advice, has questioned whether the Committee on Trade and Environment is “an appropriate forum”[50] for such discussions.
[51] Legitimacy and accountability of these relatively novel arrangements rests upon establishing the right degree of institutionalisation and balanced hybridity, both of which vary within different contexts.