International Traffic in Arms Regulations
[1] The United States government has adopted two types of regulations to control exports of military-relevant items: ITAR, which cover weapons and defense articles specifically (such as missiles); and the Export Administration Regulations, which cover items that may have uses in defense articles (such as a radar component used in a certain missile).
For practical purposes, ITAR regulations dictate that information and material pertaining to defense and military-related technologies (items listed on the U.S.
Until 1996–1997, ITAR classified strong cryptography as arms and prohibited their export from the U.S.[5] Another change occurred as a result of Space Systems/Loral's conduct after the February 1996 failed launch of the Intelsat 708 satellite.
[8]: § 123.10 Collaborative programs (also known as "Armaments Cooperative Projects" ("ACPs")) between the U.S. and foreign Governments (such as the Joint Strike Fighter) may also authorize export of USML items (subject to strict controls).
This can cause significant problems for foreign governments and organizations from countries with large first generation immigrant populations (which is discussed in more detail under "Controversy").
[27] These clauses will generally permit access by dual and third country nationals from NATO, EU, Japan, Switzerland, New Zealand and Australia (subject to certain conditions).
The most notable enforcement action was the $100M penalty applied to ITT as a result of the unauthorized retransfer of night vision technology to the PRC in 2007.
[35] Other major U.S. defense contractors penalized for alleged[36] breaches of ITAR in recent years include (among others) Lockheed Martin,[37] Motorola,[38] Boeing,[39] L-3 Communications,[40] and Northrop Grumman.
Actions are often initiated by U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and include: Since 1990, the U.S. Government has also operated the "Blue Lantern" end-use monitoring program.
[58][59] Other countries also encourage their nationals who are using USML items to implement internal export compliance programs to address ITAR requirements.
In late 2012, the US Congress passed the 2013 defense authorization bill which, if signed into law, will allow U.S. satellite manufacturers to "be more able to collaborate with international partners and [place] U.S. component makers on a more even footing in the global marketplace.
The bill still restricts the export and transfer of technology to China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
[19] As part of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the U.S. Congress included a partial exemption from ITAR for the U.K. and Australia as long as their export controls laws were comparable to the U.S's.
[61] On August 15, 2024, the State Department determined that export control regimes of Australia and the U.K. were comparable to the U.S's which will allow for license-free trade for more than 70% of items covered by ITAR between the three AUKUS countries from September 1, 2024.
[62] There is an open debate between the Department of State and the industries and academia regulated by ITAR concerning how harmful the regulatory restrictions are for U.S.-domiciled businesses and higher education institutions.
[63][64] ITAR generally prohibits foreign persons from collaborating with US citizens on projects pertaining to items on the USML without export licensing, as such work can be construed to fall under one of the several enumerated definitions of "export," such as:[65] Where the definition of "defense service" includes "the furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles."
The ITAR specifies that the products of "fundamental research" are not considered controlled "technical data," so long as they are published freely.
[70] This and similar policies are particularly damaging to international students studying aerospace engineering or related fields at U.S. universities, as opportunities to gain practical experience in their studies through internships are, due to licensing requirements, typically not offered to them at U.S. aerospace companies, and on-campus projects, when allowed, offer an alternate route for developing skills like those obtained through internships and co-op programs.
The Department of State insists that ITAR has limited effect and provides a security benefit to the nation that outweighs any impact that these sectors must bear.
Every year, the Department of State can cite multiple arrests of ITAR violators by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and the FBI.
[71] It is apparent that companies and institutions within the affected areas are somewhat stifled by ITAR regulations, in addition to the trade the U.S. economy would receive, and the science technology that it would share, notwithstanding that its restrictions encourage U.S. allies (such as Australia and the UK) to procure defense equipment from other sources that may not be interoperable with U.S.
[72] Companies argue that ITAR is a significant trade barrier that acts as a substantial negative subsidy, weakening U.S. industries' ability to compete.
[63][74][75][76] In 2008, officials at the Department of State dismissed the burden on industry and educational institutions as minor compared to the contributions to national security provided by ITAR.
It is open to the U.S. Government to refuse to authorize retransfer of a foreign product that includes USML items: As a consequence of the blocking of these sales, Venezuela has subsequently purchased aircraft and other military hardware from Russia and Belarus.
Example: General Dynamics Land Systems was fined US$20m in 2004 for breaches of the AECA by its predecessor, GM Defense, that included access to USML items by unauthorized dual nationals.
[98] It is important to note that, in both cases, theoretical access to the USML items overseas or by foreign persons is sufficient to constitute a breach of ITAR.
[100] After the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster resulted in a growing backlog of commercial satellite launches, ITAR kept the Soviet Union out of the market.
[100] China used the results of the insurance investigation to improve the reliability of its Long March rockets, which would not experience another mission failure until 2011.
[102] The European company Thales Alenia Space developed a line of ITAR-free satellites that used no restricted U.S. components, allowing them to be launched on Chinese rockets between 2005 and 2012.
[105] However, the U.S. Department of State did not accept the ITAR-free status of these satellites and fined the US company Aeroflex $8 million for selling ITAR components.
