Can the character of indifference be predicated of the act, considered not as an abstraction of the mind, but in the concrete, as it is exercised by the individual in particular circumstances, and for a certain end?
So too do Francisco Suárez;[9] Charles René Billuart;[10] Alphonsus Liguori;[11] Thomas Bouquillon;[12] Augustine Lehmkuhl;[13] and Hieronymus Noldin [de].
[14] The Thomists, no less than the Scotists, recognize as morally indifferent acts done without deliberation, such, for instance, as the stroking of one's beard or the rubbing of one's hands together, as these ordinarily take place.
Again, most of the Thomists will allow that an act would be indifferent in the case where an agent would judge it to be neither good nor bad after he had formed his conscience, according to the opinion of Scotists.
Hence those acts in which the agent adverts to no end, and which have for their object nothing that is either conformable to our rational nature, nor yet contrary to it, such as eating, drinking, taking recreation, and the like, cannot be accounted morally good.
Hence that which we have described as good in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, and as indifferent to the mind of Duns Scotus, must according to these theologians, be deemed nothing else than bad.