[1] On October 22, 1981, Inex-Adria sent a request to authorize the charter flight, which received the number JP-1308, from Ljubljana to Ajaccio and back, on 1 December of the same year.

The aircraft was powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-217 turbofan engines (numbers P708403D and P708404D), each developing 20,850 pounds of thrust and having a total operating time of 683 hours, recorded since check A-47.

He received his pilot license for jet aircraft on 16 April 1968 at the Yugoslav Academy of the Air Force in Zadar and was qualified to fly the F-84, T-33, and F-86.

[2]: 3  At 07:08, the aircraft was in Italian airspace when the controller in Padua contacted a colleague in Ajaccio and requested the actual weather report.

The southwest (240°) moderate wind was blowing at the airport at that time 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph), and the sky was covered with separate clouds.

When the pilots received weather reports, they decided to land on runway 03, while the captain clarified that if the wind increased, they would fly around for inspection.

At some point, first officer Terglav let his young son enter the cockpit, as a child's voice was heard asking when the aircraft would descend.

[1][2]: 18 At 07:35, the crew entered the air traffic control space in Marseille and subsequently established radio contact at 07:35:50, reporting the passage of flight level (FL) 210 and descending to 190 in the direction of Ajaccio, after which he requested permission for a further reduction.

Giving permission to descend, the controller used non-standard terminology, "cleared down 110", to which the crew later discussed in the cockpit.

In this process, during the preparatory procedure, the child was heard twice, speaking about observing a mountain similar to Servin; according to the investigation, it was of the Monte Cinto array.

At 07:43:57 the captain reported reaching FL 110 at a distance of 28 miles (24 nmi; 45 km) and on a VOR Ajaccio.

Here the approach controller unnecessarily complicated his instruction by adding QNH 1009 (a redundant piece of information he had already provided to JP 1308), but this was not critical, only somewhat increasing the mental load of the crew.

In addition, it can be observed here that repeated info on QNH by the approach controller was completely unnecessary and increased the crew's mental load, as Capt.

This is the third main understanding, and at this point, the ensuing disaster still could have been avoided if ATC were to notice the discrepancy between the flight's pattern and its directions.

Three seconds later, at 07:53:20, the aircraft's left wing struck a barren surface near the top of Mont San-Pietro at 4,464 feet (1,361 m).

With 8.5 metres (28 ft) of the left wing sheared off, the aircraft rolled upside down, entered into an uncontrolled dive and violently crashed into the gorge on the other side of the mountain eight seconds later, killing everyone on board.

Finally, at 12:40, a wing fragment was found on the top of Mount San Pietro, 15 kilometres (9.3 mi; 8.1 nmi) from the coast.

The crew, apparently surprised at the instruction to descend, repeated several times that they were still in the holding pattern, which the control acknowledged.

The investigation determined that the imprecise language used by the crew of the MD-81 and the air traffic controller played a significant role in the accident.

[clarification needed] The air traffic controller in charge of Flight 1308 was transferred to another airport in France.

They visited the crash site in Corsica and found many of the airplane's parts still scattered on Mont San-Pietro, in rugged and inaccessible terrain.

A Slovenian team of about 60 soldiers, mountain rescuers, civil protection and rescue service members, medical personnel, and other volunteers removed about 27 tons of aircraft remains in May 2008.