From the first days of the uprising, the Polish command intended to establish a corridor between the two districts, but it only became possible to undertake serious offensive actions after the arrival of nearly 900 Home Army soldiers from the Kampinos Forest to Żoliborz.

[12] During the planning stage of the insurgent operation, some officers of the Żoliborz Subdistrict argued that due to the weak armament of their own units, the number of attack objectives should be reduced, and in the initial phase of combat, they should focus on blocking the strongest points of German resistance.

Particularly active in this discussion was Captain Marian Kamińskicodenamed Ster, commander of Region I, who advocated for his units to strike with full force at the Citadel during "W" Hour, and subsequently concentrate on capturing Warszawa Gdańska railway station.

[13][14] According to the operational order issued by the district command on July 25, 1944, the Żoliborz Subdistrict was to attack 18 "targets of combat", with the task of Region I being to capture the Citadel, Warszawa Gdańska railway station, the bridges, the Institute of Chemistry, and the school at Krajewski Street.

[22][23] In response, during a briefing at 2:00 PM, the district headquarters decided that Paweł would conduct reconnaissance by combat in the station area only, and in case of encountering strong resistance, he would break off the attack and join the main forces of the region.

[47] Furthermore, the insurgent command believed it would be easier to secure a corridor to Żoliborz than to establish a connection with Śródmieście, whose defenders in Old Town were separated from the main forces of the German Battle Group Reinefarth.

[81][87] According to General Albin Skroczyński, Szymon missed the only good opportunity during those days to effectively assist the besieged Old Town and create conditions for establishing tactical communication with the rest of the city.

[96] On August 15, Lieutenant Colonel Roman sent a message to Victor, informing him that he was handing over all armed units from the Błonie and Sochaczew districts to his disposal, while confirming the order to take command of the Kampinos Group.

[97] Colonel Wachnowski, without communication with Okoń and unaware of the difficulties he encountered in attempting to cross to Żoliborz, decided not to wait for further developments and immediately ordered the Kampinos units to set out to relieve Warsaw.

[119] During the meeting, he expressed his conviction that attacking Stawki and Wola – in the dark, with divided forces, and without prior reconnaissance of enemy positions – was an ill-conceived and hopeless action, and executing it would be at best an act of desperation and a pre-determined defeat.

Upon arriving at Żoliborz, junior officers accused Victor of incompetence and cowardice, and shortly thereafter, the Chief of Staff of the Home Army Headquarters, General Tadeusz Pełczyński, codenamed Grzegorz, ordered him to return to his original district, without imposing any official sanctions on him.

According to his plans, the Old Town Paweł Group was to attempt to recapture the warehouses at Stawki during the night of August 16/17, while the Żoliborz units under Colonel Żywiciel were tasked with engaging enemy forces in the Warszawa Gdańska railway station area.

For inaction, I will hold commanders legally responsible [...]On August 18, in a radio message, Okoń informed Wachnowski that he had completed the formation of a strike force and would be ready to depart for Warsaw at 9:00 PM on the same day.

[171][172] The remaining subunits of Okoń's battalion reached Żoliborz on August 20 at 4:30 AM and settled in Warsaw Cooperative Housing blocks on Suzin Street, where forest fighters had been stationed for four days alongside Colonel Victor's forces.

[202] On the other hand, Edward Bonarowski claimed that during briefings preceding the attack, subunit commanders were assured that they could expect, at most, shelling from advanced German machine gun nests in the ruins of barracks for the unemployed on Feliński Street.

[214][218][220][222] Second wave units did not engage, as the soldier from Lieutenant Jaskólski's company, tasked with signaling the agreed-upon green flare upon reaching the tracks, was torn to shreds along with the rocket launcher by an artillery shell.

[200] First wave units departed from their base positions near high school and the so-called "City Blocks" (Dan), and from houses on the even-numbered side of Wojska Polskiego Avenue opposite the allotment gardens (Wara and Grot).

At 10:00 PM, German infantry supported by tanks resumed their attack, but anticipating the forest units' counterattack, Colonel Paweł, commanding the defense of this sector, ordered the extremely exhausted soldiers to hold their positions at all costs.

Some sources state that in the open space between the edge of the Old Town buildings and the railway tracks, the Polish unit came under intense fire from enemy machine guns and artillery, after which they withdrew along Bonifraterska Street.

Meanwhile, the Żaglowiec, Żyrafa, and Żbik groups, along with a mortar detachment, were to engage in feigned attacks and suppressive fire to tie down the garrisons at the Citadel, Chemical Institute, and German artillery positions in Buraków.

[267][268] In response, Colonel Żywiec persuaded the unit commanders that the first attack had led the Germans to retreat from advanced positions along the circumferential railway line, making the northern side of the tracks the only significant obstacle due to heavy artillery fire.

[285] In older publications, it is usually stated that because General Grzegorz forbade the use of flare signals and ordered the attack to begin at a specific time, it was impossible to properly synchronize the actions, and the Polish units started the battle unevenly.

[264][294][295][296] One of the platoons from the Sochaczew Company, led by Second Lieutenant Zawieja, in the darkness of the night mistook the main line of the circumferential railway for the branch leading to Palmiry and instead of attacking southward, turned west.

[330] Edward Bonarowski estimated the highest number of Polish losses, claiming that the Kampinos and Żoliborz units lost a total of about 600 dead and wounded, the vast majority of whom perished during the second attack.

[366] Upon hearing that the corridor to Żoliborz had not been secured, the Home Army Headquarters, along with the Government Delegate for Poland and members of the Council of National Unity, decided to leave the Old Town and move through the sewers to the city center, which took place on August 26.

[367] In the opinion of Władysław Bartoszewski,[360] Adam Borkiewicz,[368] Jan Gozdawa-Gołębiowski,[295] Stanisław Podlewski,[369] as well as Lesław Bartelski and Felicjan Majorkiewicz,[370] the defeat at the Warszawa Gdańska railway station was a turning point, sealing the fate of the subsequent fall of the Old Town.

None of these opportunities were given to us.The bodies of the Home Army soldiers who fell in the assaults on the Warszawa Gdańska railway station were buried by the Germans near the ruins of the barrack housing estate for the unemployed, near the Chemical Institute, and on Stawki Street.

On September 29, 1957, thanks to the efforts of the Żoliborz District National Council, a modest monument in the form of a boulder placed on a pedestal was unveiled at the intersection of Mickiewicz and General Zajączek streets, commemorating the insurgents who fell in the attacks on the Warszawa Gdańska railway station.

[376] Since 1994, the commemorative boulder bears the inscription:[377]In tribute to the heroic soldiers of the Home Army, insurgent units from Żoliborz and the Old Town, and partisans from the Kampinos and Nalibocka Forests who fell in the assault on the Warszawa Gdańska railway station on August 20 and 22, 1944.On the pedestal, additional letters form a quote from a poem by Juliusz Słowacki: And when needed – they go to death one by one, like stones thrown by God on the ramparts.

It bears the inscription:[380]In tribute to the insurgents, soldiers of the Home Army Radosław Group, battalions Zośka and Czata 49 defending the Old Town, who fell on August 22, 1944, at the Kazimierz Sosnkowski Stadium during the attack on the Warszawa Gdańska railway station.