An object with intrinsic value may be regarded as an end, or in Kantian terminology, as an end-in-itself.
All major normative ethical theories identify something as being intrinsically valuable.
Similarly, consequentialists may identify pleasure, the lack of pain, and/or the fulfillment of one's preferences as having intrinsic value, making actions that produce them merely instrumentally valuable.
End is roughly similar, and often used as a synonym, for the following concepts: This table attempts to summarize the main intrinsic value of different life stances and other views, although there may be great diversity within them: There may be zero, one, or several things with intrinsic value.
[5] Multism may not necessarily include the feature of intrinsic values to have a negative side—e.g., the feature of utilitarianism to accept both pain and pleasure as of intrinsic value, since they may be viewed as different sides of the same coin.
Ietsism (Dutch: ietsisme, 'somethingism') is a term used for a range of beliefs held by people who, on the one hand, inwardly suspect—or indeed believe—that there is “more between Heaven and Earth” than we know about, but on the other hand do not accept or subscribe to the established belief system, dogma or view of the nature of God offered by any particular religion.
There is an ongoing discussion on whether an absolute intrinsic value exists at all, for instance in pragmatism.
In pragmatism, John Dewey's[7] empirical approach did not accept intrinsic value as an inherent or enduring property of things.
He saw it as an illusory product of our continuous ethic valuing activity as purposive beings.
In other words, Dewey claimed that anything can only be of intrinsic value if it is a contributory good.