[10] It also acted as an Islamist pressure group with prominent social media activism and mass mobilizations against pro-government activists, ethnic Chinese, Christian minority, as well as liberal and reformist politicians.

[15] The government said that the FPI had threatened Indonesia's national ideology, committed illegal raids and atrocities including terrorism, and its organizational permit had expired.

The incident was triggered by the killing of a local Betawi Muslim teenager by Ambonese Christian, and rapidly escalated into a Muslim-Christian riot which claimed dozens of lives.

[28] Later, it transformed itself into an Islamist pressure group which furthers its political motives by promoting what is considered as religious or racial propaganda through the Internet and occasional anti-government campaigns.

The Indonesian military, which previously suppressed political Islam during the New Order era, had been approaching conservative Islamic groups since Feisal Tanjung was inaugurated as the commander in 1993, to disguise the military's continued role controlling the people in the face of criticism from the more moderate to left-wing segments of Indonesian society, including the some 3000 non-governmental organizations working there.

[31] Even after 2002, FPI acted in cooperation with military and police on several occasions, including in 2010 and 2011 to shut down public debates held by LGBT and Ahmadiyya activists.

[37] In November 2020, the Home Affairs Ministry said FPI had lost its legal status as a civil organization because its registration certificate had expired on 20 June 2019.

FPI spokesman Munarman countered that organizations do not require a registration certificate for legal status, as freedom to assembly is enshrined in the Indonesian Constitution.

[41] Amnesty International Indonesia said "police must be open and transparent about the incident and what led to the use of firearms against the supporters of FPI leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab.

[61] The ban categorized FPI as a "forbidden organization",[62] giving law enforcement officials the right to disperse its organizational activities or gatherings.

[73][74] Head of the West Bandung branch of Nation and Political Unity Body (Kesbangpol), Suryaman stated that they minimally detected the foundation of the new FPI.

[81] Instead of becoming hostile as its predecessors, the Islamic Brotherhood Front tends to be peaceful with other organizations, especially with the Nahdlatul Ulama's militia body Banser working together to help victims of 2021 Semeru eruption.

[87][88] Nearly one month after the bombing, on 27 April 2021, former Islamic Defenders Front General Secretary and Muhammad Rizieq Shihab's close confidante, Munarman, was arrested.

[90] He also charged by police to be involved with "bay'ah" of terrorists' group and their pledge of allegiance to ISIL in Makassar, Jakarta, and Medan terror networks.

This stirred up controversy over the use of the local administrative law in accordance with Sharia, running counter to the Indonesian constitution, which guarantees freedom of religious practice.

[96] In early 2017, the FPI and related Islamist groups staged a mass protest against a newly built church in Bekasi, West Java.

[97] Like many other Islamist groups in Indonesia, the FPI holds a negative sentiment toward ethnic Chinese people, often to the point of spreading hate speech, racist remarks and threats of lynching against them.

[98] Similarly, a group attacked the Ahmadiyyah headquarters near Bogor and harassed its members in areas such as in East Lombok, Manislor, Tasikmalaya, Parung, and Garut.

[100] In January 2017, the FPI called for the withdrawal of Rupiah banknotes, and accused it of allegedly displaying the image of the banned hammer and sickle logo.

It is widely believed that the Islamist anti-communist rhetoric is the reason behind the showing of docudrama film Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI on some Indonesian national televisions beginning in 2017, 20 years after it was once a mandatory viewing material by the New Order government.

This campaign notably intensified under Joko Widodo's presidency, especially following former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's alleged blasphemy incident in 2016.

In its early days, FPI targeted shops and vendors that are open or sells alcohol during the month of Ramadan, most of which were reportedly forced to close down or ransacked.

Its members inspected cars passing through the front gate of Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM) in Central Jakarta where the Indonesia Theater Federation Awards ceremony was being held, attempting to stop Mulyadi from attending the event.

[110] The FPI gained renewed notoriety for its efforts to topple the administration of former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly known as Ahok.

The FPI criticised Basuki's background as a Christian and Chinese Indonesian, both being minorities, citing that the position of the governor of Jakarta should be reserved only for Muslims.

[112][113] Ignoring government regulations on COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, FPI members attended a mass gathering at Rizieq's home in Jakarta's Petamburan neighborhood.

[37] Various critics and media outlets have described the FPI as inciting extremism, racism and bigotry, particularly noting its occasional hate crimes, discrimination against minorities and religious intolerance.

[122] A formal letter from the Central Kalimantan administration stated that they firmly rejected the FPI and would not let them establish a chapter in the province because it "contradicts the local wisdom of the Dayak tribe that upholds peace".

FPI's paramilitary division known as Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI), which conducts all the vigilantism, is attached to the Department of Jihad and State Defense of the Executive Board.

Although the networks penetrate into district and sub-district levels, they are loosely coordinated, and often there are cases of fragmentation such as FPI Surakarta branch which claims to be independent of the headquarters in Jakarta.