Her claim was based upon an alleged entitlement to reasonably continuous electric service to her home, and that the electric company's termination of service for alleged nonpayment, an action allowed by a provision of the company's general tariff approved by the PUC, constituted state action that deprived her of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The district court granted Metropolitan Edison's motion to dismiss the complaint of Jackson on the ground that the termination of service was not state action, and hence was not subject to judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment.

[4] The Supreme Court, noting similar decision regarding terminations by other public utility companies, granted certiorari to review the judgment.

The opinion compared the regulation of the utility to the factual situation in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961),[6] and Moose Lodge No.

The Marshall dissent suggests that the majority opinion had, in effect, either overruled or restricted Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

The majority opinion noted that the court in Pollak did not determine whether the playing of the radio programs on the regulated transit system constituted state action as a result of the regulation by the D.C. PUC, but simply assumed state action for the purposes of evaluating the constitutional questions.