The army also included a large number of north-eastern and lowland Scots, along with substantial Franco-Irish and English contingents, who were drilled and organised in line with contemporary European military practices.
[10] Co-operation with O'Sullivan was essential but failed to develop, Murray arguing Highland customs better suited the bulk of their recruits and it was unrealistic to expect them to execute weapons drill or carry out written orders.
There was some truth in both positions; plenty of Scots served in European armies but the military aspects of clan society had been in decline for decades and most Highland levies were illiterate agricultural workers.
[12] Even for regular troops, training was a concern as infantry drill became increasingly complex; before and after 1746, peacetime inspections consistently noted an alarmingly high number of British regiments as 'Not fit for service.'
After Prestonpans and Falkirk, the clan chiefs could not prevent large numbers of their levies returning home; when Charles wanted to attack Cumberland in early February 1746, he was told the army was in no state to fight a battle.
Disappointment and heavy drinking resulted in repeated accusations by Charles that the Scots were traitors, reinforced when Murray advised abandoning plans to invade England.
He and Charles previously clashed in France and his first act was to countermand instructions new recruits be sent into England; as an officer in the French army, he had orders not to leave Scotland until all fortresses held by British government troops had been taken.
[24] This obligation was based on traditional clan warfare, which was short-term and emphasised raiding, rather than set piece battles; even experienced Highland generals like Montrose in 1645 or Dundee in 1689 struggled to keep their armies together and it continued to be a problem in 1745.
[29] Long after the Rising was over, the region continued to feature in Government reports as a centre of Jacobite 'disaffection', with the shipmasters of Montrose, Stonehaven, Peterhead and other ports involved in a two-way traffic of exiles and recruits for French service.
[30] This extended outside Scotland; after Prestonpans, Walter Shairp, a merchant from Edinburgh working in Liverpool, joined a local pro-government volunteer force known as the 'Liverpool Blues,' which participated in the second siege of Carlisle.
[citation needed] While many volunteered simply for adventure, Stuart loyalism played a part, as did attempts by Charles to follow his predecessors in appealing to disenfranchised groups in general, whether religious or political.
Many Tories abandoned the Stuarts in 1688 when James' policies seemed to threaten the primacy of the Church of England; ensuring that remained a concern, whether it be from Catholics like Charles and his exile advisors or the Scots Calvinists that formed the bulk of his army.
[39] There was even a Quaker at Culloden, Jonathan Forbes, laird of Brux in Aberdeenshire, one of the only places in Scotland to establish a meaningful Non-Conformist presence during the period of religious toleration under the Protectorate in the 1650s.
The structured nature of society meant this required men with social and financial standing, who could first attract recruits, then equip and pay them in advance; it was here the lack of support from the English gentry was most felt.
The short-term patterns of clan warfare meant this was especially true among Highlanders; after Prestonpans and Falkirk, many went home to secure their plunder, a factor that delayed the invasion of England and led to the retreat from Stirling.
[50] Decisions were sometimes made contrary to the wishes, or even threats, of their chief; the men of Glen Urquhart committed to the Rising only after a "lengthy and mature debate" held on a Sunday in Kilmore churchyard.
A large group were drafted into the Irish Picquets from Guise's 6th Regiment of Foot after the surrender of their garrisons at Inverness and Fort Augustus; 98 were retaken at Culloden of whom many would have faced summary execution.
[56] The quotas were filled in various ways and one third of the Jacobites from Banffshire were reported to have been 'hired out by the County': as with the British army, paid substitution was also common, in which an individual hired another person to serve in their place.
They were intercepted by HMS Lion and after a four hour battle with Elizabeth, both were forced to return to port, depriving Charles of the regular soldiers originally intended as the core of the Jacobite army.
[65] Including a small number of specialists, such as Mirabel de Gordon, the allegedly incompetent artillery officer who supervised the Siege of Stirling Castle, this implies a maximum of 600 to 700 regular troops.
[68] Commissions were often used to reward those who brought in recruits, while O'Sullivan noted the Highlanders "would not mix or separate, & wou'd have double officers, [that] is two Captns & two Lts, to each Compagny, strong or weak".
Even professional soldiers required constant training in firing and reloading; the Jacobites lacked time, weapons and ammunition, although Murray reportedly used a simplified but effective form of drill for them.
Traditional depictions of the Jacobite army often showed men dressed in Highland fashion and armed with broadswords and targes, weaponry essentially unchanged since the 17th century.
At the start many of the Highland levies were poorly armed: one Edinburgh resident reported that the Jacobites carried a mixture of antiquated guns, agricultural tools like pitchforks and scythes and a few Lochaber axes and swords.
[98] At the start of the Rising Charles managed to procure a shipment of broadswords made cheaply in Germany (famously carrying the inscription "Prosperity to Schotland and no Union") and 2,000 targes.
However, following the victory at Prestonpans and subsequent shipments of French and Spanish pattern 17.5 mm muskets into Montrose and Stonehaven, the army had access to modern firelocks fitted with bayonets, which formed the main weaponry of the rank and file.
[103] The tactic was less successful when opposing troops held their ground, particularly as it was customary to fire a single shot at close range, then drop the firearm and charge home with the sword.
The well-dressed cavalry were used in an attempt to impress the local populace in several places: an observer at Derby said that they were "likely young men" who "made a fine show", whereas the infantry "appeared more like a parcel of chimney sweeps".
[109] A detailed examination of available records concluded that the maximum operational force available to the Jacobites was about 9,000 men, with the total recruitment during the campaign possibly reaching as high as 13,140 exclusive of Franco-Irish reinforcements.
Although many Jacobites went into hiding or simply returned home after dismissal, a total of 3,471 men were recorded as prisoners after the rebellion, though this figure probably includes some double counting, French POWs, and civilians.