India The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) aimed at disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by force and capturing the city of Jaffna, Sri Lanka, in the opening stages of Operation Pawan during the Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War.

Mounted on the midnight of 12 October 1987, the operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8's of the No.109 Helicopter Unit, the 10th Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh Light Infantry.

The heli-dropped force suffered significant casualties, with nearly the entire Sikh LI detachment of twenty-nine troops, along with six Para commandos, killed in action.

Under the terms of the agreement,[2][3] Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, and the Tamil rebels were to disarm.

[4] Also, on the request of President J. R. Jayewardene, India was to send a contingent, the IPKF, to Northern Sri Lanka as a peacekeeping force.

[11] The Colombo government alleged the boat was involved in smuggling arms across the Palk Strait and on the grounds denied immunity to these captured Tiger separatists.

[11] The LTTE denied this claiming the separatist's movement were in accordance with the truce, being in the process of transferring documents for shifting the Tigers Headquarters from Madras to Jaffna.

The Sri Lankan government intended to bring a number of the seperatists captured, including Pulendran, Kumarappa and others, to trial in Colombo for allegedly masterminding the massacre of a hundred and fifty civilians.

Intelligence further indicated the meeting was to be attended by a number of high-profile Tiger leaders, including Velupillai Prabhakaran, Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja (alias Mahattaya), as well as the LTTE local commanders.

To minimise exposure to ground-fire, fast-roping was ruled out and the decision was made to assign the first wave of the Paras with the additional responsibility as pathfinders to mark the drop-zone.

A Sri Lankan Air Force Bell 212 gunship was detailed to carry out a diversionary strike west of the drop-zone across the railway tracks, which the Indian troops were under strict orders not to exceed.

[13] On the morning of 11 October, a reconnaissance flight over the University however revealed that the football field- the designated drop-zone- may be unable to accommodate four helicopters in a single wave.

[13] Holding off outside the drop zone in the face of expected hostile fire was ruled out and a change in the plans saw the decision made to divide each wave into two flights of a pair of Mi-8s.

Several 50 calibre machineguns had been moved to the north of the football field, and Tiger cadres had laid an ambush for the Indian troops.

[13] The helicopter formation, led by Wg Cdr Sapre and Sqn Ldr Vinayraj as number two, approached the drop zone in low visibility observing complete black-out.

As the second flight approached the drop zone, the pilots Flt Lt V Prakash and Sqn Ldr Duraiswami could identify the flashes of small arms fire and grenades.

[13] By the time the first flight of the second wave—flown again by Sapre and Vinayraj—took off from Palali Airbase however, the Tigers had been able to identify the approach route and moved troops and heavy machine guns to the rooftop of a building north of the field.

As Sapre and Vinayraj approached their target zone, the Tigers directed heavy and sustained machinegun fire to the choppers, aiming at the cargo-hold.

As the heavy machine gun fire pierced the metal skin of the helicopters, at least one commando on Vinayraj's flight was hit and wounded badly.

The LTTE had already moved in snipers armed with telescopic sights, and as the battle raged, they were able to inflict casualties on the Paras trying to hold their ground.

[13] As the pilots prepared to insert the first troops of the Delta company, 13th Sikh Light Infantry, the operation was delayed by twenty minutes.

Later analysis would show this may have been due to the Sikh Light Infantry troops, who were infantrymen, not being aware of the embarkation routine of heliborne operations.

[13] Debating whether to scrub the mission and extract the troops, or to press on with the possibility of capturing the LTTE high command and in particular hunting down Prabhakaran, the decision was taken by Harikat Singh to instruct the Paras to stick to the operational plans previously set.

With all radio contact with the Sikh Light Infantry platoon lost and their fate unknown, the Paras' situation now became the major concern for all those in HQ 54 Div.

As the morning progressed, GOC Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh arrived in an Army HAL Chetak helicopter to carry out a personal reconnaissance of the situation, drawing heavy small arms fire from the ground.

Although the Para Commandos were successfully extricated, the fate of the Sikh Light Infantry remained largely unknown until recounted by Sepoy Gora Singh, who had been taken prisoner, and was later released.

When the Indian Army finally reached the area after a week of heavy fighting, they found the battlefield littered with pieces of Sikh Light Infantry's uniforms and equipment, along with thousands of .50 MG shells.

According to Singh, the dead Sikhs were stripped of their weapons, uniforms and equipment and their bare bodies laid out in a row at the nearby Buddhist Nagaraja Vihar temple.

[23] Lt. Col. Dalvir Singh, the Commanding Officer of 10 Para SF who volunteered and led the rescue mission, was awarded Vir Chakra for "conspicuous courage and valiant leadership".

[24] Major Anil Kaul of the 65 Armoured Regiment, was also awarded the Vir Chakra for his actions, having lost his right eye and left hand.