[2][1] Davis then joined the Salt Lake City based firm of Ray, Quinney and Nebeker where he worked as a shareholder and director until his appointment to the bench.
On January 14, 2009, a highway patrolman out looking for drug activity observed a Lincoln Town Car with Texas license plates, driven by Duhaime, traveling eastbound on Interstate 80 in Summit County.
The patrolman began to question Duhaime about travel plans and concluded that the driver's answers were inconsistent and nervously spoken.
When the dog arrived, it alerted on the trunk of the car, where the officers subsequently found seventy-six one-pound vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana.
We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of Duhaime's motion to suppress, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Upset about his ex-wife's remarriage, Watkins drank a significant amount of alcohol while the other three children were all sleeping in her room.
Following the incident the Child no longer wished to visit the Father's home while Watkins was there and after a couple weeks the Stepmother asked what was wrong.
On appeal, Judge Davis authored the opinion of the court and concluded: "The trial court did not err by denying Watkins's motion to dismiss because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found both that he was in a position of special trust with the respect to the Child and that he had the requisite intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires.
On December 31, 2009, a quitclaim deed was recorded by which Home Buyer transferred her interest in the Eagle Mountain property to CPA.
CPA filed a complaint in February 2010 that stated four causes of action based upon its assertion that the Deed of Trust was separated from the Note shortly after being executed and therefore is and "has been unenforceable by defendant[s]" for quite some time.
In its memorandum decision, the district court converted the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment because of what it determined to be extraneous document evidence attached to both parties' pleadings.
In rendering its decision, the district court ruled that "[t]he premise underlying each of [CPA's] causes of action is an assertion that Defendants lost the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the property when the Note was 'securitized.'"
The district court then characterized this underlying principle as a "mere conclusory allegation," and found that "the express terms of the Trust Deed unassailably provide that MERS has the right to foreclose upon the Property, even if [Lender] sold the Note."
CPA requests that we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to deny MERS and Citi's motion to dismiss based on its assertion that its "underlying principle"‐‐that securitization stripped MERS and Citi of the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the Eagle Mountain property‐‐is a factual statement.
Judge Davis offered the opinion of the court: CPA's "underlying principle" that securitization nullified MERS's and Citi's rights as expressly set forth in the Deed of Trust is an incorrect legal assertion.
When Bud Bailey had not received the funds by January 25, 2007, the trial court issued a Garnishee Order to Show Cause in re Contempt for the Bank's failure to comply with the writ.
On the day of the hearing on the order of show cause, the Bank filed its Response to the Garnishment and Order to show cause in re Contempt, claiming a right to offset the funds to satisfy over $300,000 in outstanding loans made by the Bank to Construction Associates and providing documents evidencing its security interest in the checking account.
As a result, the trial court ordered the Bank to pay the entire sum remaining on the garnishment, $38,769.71, as well as Bud Bailey's attorney fees.
The bank appealed, conceding that it had erred by failing to claim the offset in its response to the interrogatories but arguing that the writ of garnishment did not apply to the after-deposited funds.
This court agreed, holding that "the Writ of Garnishment only had effect with regard to the funds that were held by the Bank at the time the Write was served.
However, we remanded with instructions for the trial court to make "a determination for what amount, if any, Bank should be required to pay solely for its failure to answer adequately the interrogatory served with the Writ."
On remand, the trial court found that the Bank had "failed to provide any adequate justification for its failure to properly respond to Bud Bailey's garnishment interrogatory regarding the offsets."