[10] While legally required to remain within noncombat zones, GSDF records revealed that Japanese troops were present in areas of active hostilities.

Public opinion regarding the deployment was sharply divided, especially given that Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan prohibits the use of military forces unless for self-defence purposes (operating in Iraq seemed, at best, tenuously connected to that mission).

In order to legalize the deployment of Japanese forces in Samawah, the Koizumi administration legislated the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law on December 9, 2003, in the Diet, even though the opposition firmly opposed it.

One view is that it represents the emergence of Japan as a close military ally of the United States, strategically positioned as a counterweight to China's growing regional power.

[17] Another interpretation is that the deployment is entirely symbolic as it comes at little financial or human cost to the Koizumi administration, has a negligible effect on the strategic situation in Iraq, and is simply aimed at maintaining positive relations with the U.S. so as to perpetuate a favorable economic relationship.

Analysts said that the restrictive rules of engagement and reliance on the constant protection of others effectively renders meaningful Japanese participation in international operations impossible for the foreseeable future.

[23] Protection for the unit was provided primarily by Australian and Dutch troops,[6][24] as the Japanese soldiers were prohibited from engaging Iraqi guerrillas unless they came under fire.

[25] However, a small number of Japanese Special Forces Group,[26] Western Army Infantry Regiment, and 1st Airborne Brigade soldiers[27] were deployed to provide protection.

A united Iraqi government was established in May 2006, and Koizumi subsequently announced that forces could be withdrawn as early as the end of July given the completion of the mission.

Koizumi announced on June 20, 2006, that the Japanese contingent would be withdrawn within 'several dozen days', however he suggested expanding airborne logistical support from southern parts of the country to Baghdad in place of the ground force.