Japanese nationalism
[1] During the final days of the Tokugawa shogunate, the perceived threat of foreign encroachment, especially after the arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry and the signing of the Kanagawa Accord, led to increased prominence to the development of nationalist ideologies.
The terms were not mutually exclusive, merging into the sonnō jōi (revere the emperor, expel the barbarians) concept, which in turn was a major driving force in starting the Meiji Restoration.
The word, denoting a coherent code of beliefs and doctrines about the proper path of the samurai, or what is called generically 'warrior thought' (武家思想, buke shisō), is rarely encountered in Japanese texts before the Meiji era, when the 11 volumes of the Hagakure of Yamamoto Tsunetomo, compiled in the years from 1710 to 1716 where the character combination is employed, was finally published.
Constituted over a long time by house manuals on war and warriors, it gained some official backing with the establishment of the Bakufu, which sought an ideological orthodoxy in the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi tailored for military echelons that formed the basis of the new shogunal government.
An undercurrent of traditional warrior values never wholly disappeared, and as Japan slid towards a cycle of repeated crises from the mid-Taishō to early Shōwa eras, the old samurai ideals began to assume importance among more politicized officers in the Imperial Japanese Army.
Sadao Araki played an important role in adopting a doctrine of seishin kyōiku (spiritual training) as an ideological backbone for army personnel.
In developing the modern concepts of State Shintoism (国家神道, kokka shintō) and emperor worship, various Japanese philosophers tried to revive or purify national beliefs (kokugaku) by removing imported foreign ideas, borrowed primarily from Chinese philosophy.
Motoori Norinaga, and later Hirata Atsutane, based their research on the Kojiki and other classic Shintō texts which teach the superiority of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu.
This came to be regarded by militarists as a doctrine that the emperor was the center of the phenomenal world, lending religious impetus to ideas of Japanese territorial expansion.
From this period, the Yasukuni Shrine (founded in 1869) was converted into a focus for nationalist sentiment and received state patronage until the end of World War II.
They argue that the post-war view focused on the imperial conferences and missed the numerous "behind the chrysanthemum curtain" meetings where the real decisions were made between Hirohito, his chiefs of staff, and the cabinet.
In his 1919 book An Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan, Kita proposed a military coup d'état to promote the supposed true aims of the Meiji Restoration.
After suspending the constitution, and dissolving the Diet, the Emperor and his military defenders should work for a "collectivist direct voluntarism" to unify people and leaders.
This last was founded by Dr. Shūmei Ōkawa, professor of the Colonization Academy, and radical defender of expansionism and military armed revolution at home.
Other ideological creations of the time were the book "Shinmin no Michi" (臣民の道), the "Imperial Way" or "War Party" (Kodoha) Army party, the "Yamato spirit" (Yamato-damashii), and the idea of hakko ichiu (which directly translates to "8 corners under one roof", that means, "one house in which every people can live" or "everyone is family"), "Religion and Government Unity" (Saisei itchi), and Kokka Sodoin Ho (General Mobilization Right).
The Japanese theorists, such as Saneshige Komaki, concerned with Mainland Asia, knew the geostrategic theory of Halford Mackinder, expressed in the book Democratic Ideas and Reality.
These central Asiatic lands included: all of the Soviet Union, except the Pacific coast, west of the Volga River; all Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and Iran.
Mackinder thought in terms of land and sea power: the latter can outflank the former, and carry out distant logistical operations, but needs adequate bases.
The Japanese government, possibly following the German example of a "Worker's Front" State Syndicate, ultimately organized the Nation Service Society to group all the trades unions in the country.
Local and Manchukoan newspapers such as Manchurian Daily News (Japanese-owned) were under the control of these institutions and only published officially approved notices and information.
Perhaps the most lasting effect that came out of this constitution is Article 9 that reads: With the renunciation of war and military power, Japan looked to the United States for security.
As the Cold War began, the United States fostered a closer relationship with Japan due to the latter's strategic location in respect to the USSR.
[13] Japanese economic progress after World War II undermined the appeal of pre-war militarist nationalism, showing a path to prosperity was possible without colonies.
[14] Some scholars note the apolitical nature of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 Osaka World Exposition, which allow politicians to forge Japan as peaceful and internationalist for a unified national identity.
[13][14] The rather implicit elite advocacy of conservative nationalism has become more salient since the 1990s, where regional competitions from Asian tigers, and later China, created economic anxieties which reflected in political divisions.
The illiberal turn of nationalism started with new right-wing movements that created history textbooks from revisionist perspectives, which denies Japanese imperialist atrocities, including 'comfort women' issues and Nanjing Massacre.
[16][17] Since the 2000s, xenophobic online posts and nationalist claims against foreigners, mostly Chinese and Koreans, have risen due to anxieties over economic growth, regional competition, and globalization.
Abe tended to use ambiguous terms to describe his national agenda on controversial issues such as history education and intentionally avoided backlash from the public to equate him as an imperial leader.
In order to justify military expansions, Abe framed his security agenda as proactive pacifism, enabling Japan to exercise collective self-defense.
Activists affiliated with such groups have used Molotov cocktails and time bombs to intimidate moderate politicians and public figures, including former Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka and Fuji Xerox Chairman Yotaro Kobayashi.
