He made significant contributions in the enhancement of Japan's river systems and the development of its port facilities, which were vital in the industrialisation and infrastructure advancement of the nation during the Meiji era.

De Rijke's efforts were instrumental in substantially mitigating flood risks, enhancing navigational capabilities, and boosting trade and transportation, thereby accelerating Japan's modernisation.

Over the next thirty years, these civil engineers, joined later by Jack Lindo and Anthonie Rouwenhorst Mulder, executed numerous flood control and water management projects.

[10] He undertook works at the Kurobe alluvial fan, located on the Japan Sea coast, and took on the project of constructing a tunnel channel from Lake Biwa to Kyoto, assuming Escher's position after his return to the Netherlands.

De Rijke's inaugural undertaking in Japan involved the enhancement of the Tone River, which was affected by significant navigable depth issues arising from siltation.

A notable environmental concern was the deforestation at the summit of Mount Kabatayama, leading to pronounced surface erosion and additional sediment deposition in the Yodo River.

A hallmark of the Dutch engineers' approach was their aim to address multiple objectives through their projects, such as curbing soil erosion, disease prevention, and agricultural enhancement, all within an integrated framework that viewed a river's catchment area as a cohesive system requiring balanced water distribution.

In the latter half of the 19th century, the port of Mikuni, historically a hub of national trade on the Kitamaebune shipping route, faced a decline due to sediment deposits from the Kuzuryū River.

[18] Escher's tenure began in 1876 with an ambitious design including an arc breakwater to counteract gravel run-off, and a basin with an average water depth of three metres.

De Rijke, already grappling with existing responsibilities, faced a challenging task exacerbated by frequent disputes with Japanese executive staff and a devastating cholera outbreak in the summer of 1879.

De Rijke's proposal incorporated five layers of fascine mattresses and timber piles, bound by iron chains, and included the addition of four spur dikes.

The total cost escalated to 7.5 times Escher's original estimate, but the completion of Mikuni port reinstated its status as a modern trade hub and a pivotal transit point.

The project not only resolved the issue of drift sand but also became a learning ground for Japanese officials and engineers, facilitating the transmission of valuable construction methodologies.

Efforts to regulate these rivers date back to the Edo period, yet these early attempts largely failed to yield significant results.

In the period spanning 1878 to 1900, De Rijke undertook extensive research in this region and subsequently developed a comprehensive plan aimed at segregating the three rivers in the lower stretches of the Kiso Delta.

The execution of this ambitious plan extended until the year 1912, reflecting the scale and complexity of the intervention required to address the long-standing water management challenges in this region.

A contemporaneous photograph bears the caption: "Johannes de Rijke, an engineer employed by the Ministry of the Interior, who suffered the results of it flooding in 1899, once described it as 'not a river, but a waterfall.'

[7]: 337 The genesis of the Port of Osaka's modernisation can be traced back to 1875, when De Rijke and Van Doorn initially proposed a plan for its enhancement.

Central to De Rijke's revised proposal was the redirection of the Yodo River away from the port to mitigate silt accumulation and enhance navigability.

De Rijke's design approach drew inspiration from the IJmuiden sea lock in the Netherlands and the Port of Tanjung Priok in the Dutch East Indies.

[18] Detailed analyses and reports in 1888 by engineers Koi Furuichi, Gisaburo Tanabe, and Mulder revealed the near-identical nature of the plans in terms of overall layout, but differed fundamentally in the construction of the breakwaters.

[18] Despite the expert recommendations favouring De Rijke's design for its practicality and adaptability, the Japanese government, in a move influenced heavily by diplomatic considerations, opted for Palmer's proposal in 1889.

The English engineers benefitted from robust backing through British diplomatic channels, whereas their Dutch counterparts received negligible support from the Netherlands government.

The fundamental disparity between the two designs lay in their foundational approaches: De Rijke's plan was predicated on the use of fascine mattresses, a decision informed by the soft soils of the port's seabed.

[18] The Japanese government's decision to proceed with Palmer's design precipitated a contentious and public dispute, often played out in the press with protracted written correspondences, during which allegations of corruption were levelled against several officials.

His correspondence with the Dutch consul in Shanghai, E. van Heukelsveldt Slaghek, initially focused on the challenging sandbank at the mouth of the Huangpu Jiang (referred to as Wangpoo by De Rijke).

Despite reluctance from his Japanese employers, De Rijke, along with Escher, conducted an exploratory visit to Shanghai and compiled a report that garnered considerable attention, though it did not culminate in immediate implementation.

[32] Arriving in Shanghai with his 16-year-old son Hendrik in February 1906, De Rijke assumed the role of chief engineer of the Whangpoo Conservancy Board.

[35] Hendrik de Rijke, Johannis's son, also contributed to the project, working in Nantong in 1916 to implement his father's plans for the Yangtze River.

Tragically, Hendrik's life was cut short at the age of 29 during a cholera epidemic in 1919, while independently designing a new infrastructure with improved water management systems.