By one section, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas (in which only serjeants formerly had the right of audience), and the Exchequer, and all their jurisdiction, whether criminal, legal, or equitable, were vested in the new court.

The fusion of the systems of law and equity was not complete, however, as the Chancery (equity) division retained a distinct existence within the new court from the Queen's Bench (common law) division, having a certain range of legal questions under its exclusive control, and possessing to a certain extent a peculiar machinery of its own for carrying its decrees into execution.

Nevertheless, all actions could now for the first time be initiated in a single High Court, and (subject to such special assignments of business as mentioned) could be tried in any of its divisions.

For example, to bring an action in the common law courts a litigant had to file a "writ" chosen from a set of standard forms.

Also, the practice of the court departed from the original principle of the Lord Chancellor's conscience, wary of its legal superiority, clarified for once and for all 1615, wherever it conflicted with the common law.

To the Queen's Bench division was also attached, by an order of the Lord Chancellor dated 1 January 1884, the business of the London Court of Bankruptcy.

In a normal case, the plaintiff delivered his statement of claim, in which he was to set forth concisely the facts on which he relied, and the relief which he asked.

It may be, however, that the authors of the new system were too intent on uniformity when they abolished the common-law pleading, which, shorn of its abuses (as it had been by the Common Law Procedure Acts), was an admirable instrument for defining the issue between the parties though unsuited for the more complicated cases which are tried in chancery, and it might possibly have been better to try the new system in the first instance in the chancery division only.

Any possibility of abuse by frivolous or technical demurrers (as undoubtedly was formerly the case) had been met by powers of amendment and the infliction of costs.

Nowadays, he need not stop to think whether his cause of action or defence will hold water or not, and anything which is not obviously frivolous or vexatious will do by way of pleading for the purpose of the trial and for getting the opposite party into the box.

Formerly every issue of fact in a common law action, including the amount of damage, had to be decided by the verdict of a jury.

[6] The effect of the rules may be thus summarised: Among the specific changes to procedure that occurred as a result of enactment of the Judicature Acts was one impacting on the matter of "abandonment of an action".

Such an abandonment involves the discontinuance of proceedings commenced in the High Court, typically emerging because a plaintiff is convinced that he will not succeed in a civil action.

To make such an order at that early stage would seem to demand a prescience and intelligent anticipation of future events which can hardly be expected of a master, or even a judge in chambers, except in simple cases, involving a single issue of law or fact which the parties are agreed in presenting to the court.

In Chancery cases the order usually made is that the plaintiff deliver his statement of claim, and the rest of the summons stand over, and the practical effect is merely to add a few pounds to the costs.