[7][8] In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia in Libya, of crimes against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and sentenced to death.

[36] Kenya only provided temporary residence, and the CIA negotiated a settlement around 1990, enabling Haftar and 300 of his soldiers to move to the United States under the U.S. refugee programme.

[45] In February 2014, Haftar appeared in a televised announcement to reveal that the General National Congress (GNC), the elected parliament which had recently unilaterally extended its mandate, had been dissolved.

[46][47] Haftar's strategy was to embark on a series of "town hall" meetings around Libya and, with the support of fellow ex-officers from the military, to secretly build an army.

[11] Three months later on 16 May in Operation Dignity, Haftar began a combined air and ground assault against the pro-Islamic militias of Benghazi, as well as a sustained heavy weapons attack against the Libyan parliament.

[48] At the time of the Benghazi assault, Haftar, who had already been the target of assassination attempts,[49] reportedly explained to a friend that he was fully aware of the personal safety risks involved in his actions.

On 4 June 2014, a suicide car bomber detonated his vehicle at Haftar's residence at Ghut al-Sultan near Abayar, east of Benghazi, killing four people and injuring at least three others.

[19][64][65] After three years of military campaigns, in early July 2017 Haftar announced in a televised speech that his forces had finally taken full control of Benghazi, the second largest Libyan city.

Some of his critics claimed that he deliberately dragged his militias through years of fighting against diverse groups which he framed as Islamist enemies in order to consolidate a future political role through his military leadership.

[69] Haftar remains resolute that one of the aims of Operation Dignity is to completely dismantle the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as what he considers to be any other Islamist terrorist organizations within Libya.

[70] However, in recent years journalists and critics have observed that, in spite of his formal anti-Islamism mission, Haftar has continuously cooperated with Salafi organizations based in eastern Libya.

His ties to these groups have produced a mutually beneficial partnership in the administration of the areas controlled by Haftar's forces as well as in the military fight against their Islamist counterpart, especially against the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar al-Sharia.

[71][72] Some of the Salafi groups allied with Haftar were part of the militias based in Barqa that have fought under his leadership and eventually spread in Benghazi, Jabal al-Akhdar, and Ajdabiya.

[82][83][84] Global risk experts Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner recently observed that "Moscow appears to view Haftar – not the weak UN/Western-backed government – as the only realistic bulwark against extremism in post-Gaddafi Libya.

[9][10] On 5 November 2017, a former commander in the ranks of Operation Dignity and its former spokesperson, Mohammed Hijazi, described Khalifa Haftar as being "the main cause of the crisis that is crippling the country.

"[85] Having left Operation Dignity in January 2016 citing corrupt leadership, Hijazi has since spoken out against Haftar, calling him a "tyrant" and describing "his killings, kidnappings, destruction, and forced disappearances.

Hijazi concluded the recent interview by stating that his life is in great danger "especially as he is in possession of formal documents that could damage Dignity Operation forces and their leaders.

Emirates forces carried out a drone strike on a factory that makes food products in Wadi al-Rabie, Libya, south of Tripoli, a Human Rights Watch investigation found.

[96] On 28 August 2020, a leading media site uncovered new evidence, which implicated the United Arab Emirates in a drone strike, where 26 unarmed cadets were hit and killed by a Chinese Blue Arrow 7 missile in January 2020 at a military academy in Libya's capital, Tripoli.

[97] Haftar was the effective head of the de facto "Tobruk" system of government of much of the east and some of the south and west parts of Libya during the Second Libyan Civil War.

[98] The head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salamé, described Haftar in April 2019 as "not a great democrat" (ce n'est pas un grand démocrate) and his methods of governance as "using an iron fist" (il gouverne avec une main de fer).

[99] The Government of National Accord in June 2019 captured weapon systems in Libya's rebel compound, which included Javelin anti-tank missiles made by the US and labelled for the "armed forces of the United Arab Emirates" inside a wooden crate packaging.

[102] On September 23, 2021, Haftar temporarily withdrew his post from the command of the LNA for a potential run in the 2021 Libyan general election, which was due to take place December 23.

Three civil lawsuits have been filed against Haftar in U.S. federal court, including suits accusing him of war crimes, torture, and other human rights violations.

[114] In October 2021, the Israel Hayom reported that Belqasim Haftar signed a contract worth "tens of millions of dollars in fees" with an Israeli consulting firm to run his father's presidential campaign.

[115][116] In November 2021, Saddam Haftar secretly visited Israel on behalf of his father, allegedly seeking military aid and diplomatic assistance in return of normalizing relations.

[120] Yet ten days later, the Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade, led by Saddam and Khalid, stormed the courthouse in Sabha to prevent judges from hearing Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's appeal to participate in the presidential election.

[122][123] Later that same month, Saddam Haftar's Salafist Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade, one of the largest wing of Khalifa's Libyan National Army, was accused by Amnesty International of committing war crimes.

[124][125][126] In January 2023, Khalifa Haftar pledged to withdraw from the Libyan presidential election on the condition that his sons, Saddam and Belqasim, are allowed to run.

These activities raised significant human rights concerns and highlighted potential violations of international law, while also drawing attention to the possible indirect involvement of European entities like Frontex and Maltese officials in facilitating or turning a blind eye to these practices.