[9] The mandate system was formed as a compromise between those who advocated an Allied annexation of former German and Turkish territories, and another proposition put forward by those who wished to grant them to an international trusteeship until they could govern themselves.

[11] Over the next decade, low intensity conflicts broke out in many of the remaining European colonies as militant African nationalist movements emerged, often with direct backing from the Soviet Union and revolutionary left-wing governments in the Middle East.

[11] In 1962, SWAPO formed a militant wing, known as the South West African Liberation Army (SWALA), and began sending recruits to Egypt and the Soviet Union for guerrilla training.

[24] Dreyer had served with the SAP in Rhodesia during the Rhodesian Bush War and drew heavily on his operational experiences there while shaping Koevoet's mandate and organisational structure.

[25] The SAP especially appreciated the small unit tactics of the Selous Scouts, which had demonstrated how a few operators, disguised as insurgents and trained to high levels of subterfuge, could have an effect utterly disproportionate to their size.

[23] Its existence remained a closely guarded secret until June 1980, when church newspapers in Ovamboland began circulating rumours of a new special forces group linked to assassination of SWAPO sympathisers.

[23] The rumours had their basis in a "death list" of prominent Ovambo political figures and businessmen who were covert sympathisers of SWAPO, which was allegedly recovered from the body of a local politician killed in a motor accident.

[23] There, the recruits received instruction on a unique hybrid syllabus which combined specialist police skills such as anti-riot tactics, road security, and conventional counter-terrorism with basic infantry training resembling that of the SADF and counter-insurgency theory.

[23] In 1983, Koevoet attracted considerable controversy when an Angolan citizen serving with the unit, Jonas Paulus, was convicted of murder, attempted rape, and armed robbery by the South West African Supreme Court in Windhoek.

[23] The charges were dropped after the prosecution failed to establish whether Abrahams or one of several other Koevoet personnel present had actually committed the murder; the South African government reached an out of court settlement with the victim's family.

[23] The Paulus and Abrahams trials caused a public outcry, compelling SWAPOL to issue a statement that it would not condone any atrocities committed by Koevoet and would not hesitate to prosecute members of that unit.

[23] In 1977, South West Africa's administrator-general had issued AG Proclamation 9, which empowered any non-commissioned officer of the SAP (and subsequently, SWAPOL) to arrest and detain anybody in designated "security districts", including Ovamboland, without a warrant.

[23] Its transition of jurisdiction to SWAPOL, however, opened the unit to more scrutiny in the local judicial system, and in 1986 the Windhoek Supreme Court ruled that Koevoet could not hold suspects for more than thirty days without legal representation.

[23] As a result of the Brazzaville Protocol and subsequent Tripartite Accord, South Africa agreed to grant Namibia independence in exchange for a parallel Cuban withdrawal from Angola and a commitment by the Angolan government to cease all assistance to PLAN.

[30] The continued existence of that unit, he claimed, contravened the spirit of the independence process and their use of heavy weapons violated specific provisions concerning what equipment SWAPOL was permitted to carry to maintain basic law and order.

[34] The strategy of taking advantage of a ceasefire to establish an armed presence inside the country had previously been employed by other militant groups in the region, namely the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).

[35] On the morning of 1 April, the first PLAN cadres crossed into Ovamboland, unhindered by UNTAG, which had failed to monitor their activity in Angola due to the delays in its arrival.

[31] At the end of the day, with no signs of the PLAN advance abating, the UN Special Representative in Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, lifted all restrictions confining the SADF to its bases.

[31] Koevoet's key role in containing the initial PLAN advance had the effect of persuading many South African officials that it was the only force capable of keeping the peace in Ovamboland during the political transition.

[38] Koevoet's continued presence in Ovamboland became a matter of serious contention as UNTAG began supervising the return of Namibian refugees to participate in the territory's upcoming elections, many of whom were SWAPO supporters.

[33] De Cuéllar approached SWAPO officials and insisted they refrain from undertaking further military operations, which South Africa could use as a pretext to justify the continued deployment of Koevoet.

[33] In late April, UNTAG again lifted all restrictions confining the SADF to its bases, allowing the security forces to remove arms caches from Ovamboland and verify the absence of any remaining insurgents.

[42] Almost two weeks later, United Nations Security Council Resolution 640 was passed, condemning Koevoet for its apparent "intimidation and harassment of the civilian population" and calling for its immediate disbandment, as well as the dismantling of its command structure.

[2] Like the insurgents, Koevoet operators carried their ammunition in chest webbing rigs; this load-carrying tactic was favoured as it was less likely to restrict movement when moving through thick vegetation.

[1] The emphasis on politicisation by PLAN insurgents was the result of their training in the Soviet Union and other socialist states, which was not confined to tactical instruction but extended to the procedures for establishing a covert political-military infrastructure within enemy-held areas.

[2] Koevoet's counter-intelligence activities were equally effective, largely because the unit was more in contact with the civilian population at the local grassroots level, and unlike the intelligence organs of the SADF, was organised specifically with unconventional (i.e. counter-insurgency) warfare in mind.

[24] While Koevoet had an exceptional combat record in Namibia—during the final decade of the war it killed a little over 2,800 insurgents and captured another 463 while suffering 151 casualties[22]—it also cultivated a reputation for being particularly brutal and ruthless, as well as being indifferent towards the SADF's rules of engagement.

[6] Koevoet was accused of mistreating detainees and prisoners, subjecting them to various forms of torture, including physical assault, electric shocks, and sleep, food, and water deprivation.

[23] In 1986, the Namibian courts ruled that as all the Koevoet's detainees had been arrested by a police unit as common law criminals, they were entitled to legal representation within a period of thirty days.

[6] During the early 1980s, SWAPOL and the SADF issued vehement denials that the enemy dead were being publicly exhibited, and warned that members of the security forces who indulged in such behaviour would be prosecuted.