The Japanese objective was to seize Port Moresby by an overland advance from the north coast, following the Kokoda Track over the mountains of the Owen Stanley Range, as part of a strategy to isolate Australia from the United States.

The Kokoda Track campaign has been mythologised as Australia's Thermopylae and incorporated into the Anzac legend even though the premise of a vastly numerically superior enemy has since been shown to be incorrect.

[14] Instead, in March 1942 the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States and preventing Allied offensive operations by capturing Port Moresby,[15] the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia.

[18][19] Meanwhile, the Allied Supreme Commander in the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur set about developing airfields for the defence of Port Moresby, and to strike against the Japanese.

[38] To the Japanese, who had learned of the Gap through vague explorer's accounts,[39] it potentially offered a corridor from Buna through the Owen Stanleys along which they could launch a quick advance on Port Moresby.

[49] Walker attributes enteric infections to poor field hygiene, contaminated and unpurified water, and a failure to make adequate sanitary provisions along the track during the early part of the campaign.

[65][69] As well as defending Port Moresby, New Guinea Force commanded operations against the Japanese landings around Wau, that occurred on 8 March 1942, and was commencing development of an air base at Milne Bay.

These orders directed that a small force of Australian infantry and American engineers should march across the Kokoda Trail to Buna where they would be joined by another party moving by sea.

[107]These instructions to halt the advance appear to date from as early as 16 August: "Senior Japanese officers interviewed after the war thought that the factor most influencing the postponement was not Guadalcanal but rather 'stronger than anticipated Australian resistance at Kokoda.

[115] This campaign and the battle that followed at the Japanese beachheads around Buna and Gona were defined, for both sides, by the limitations imposed by terrain and the capability to supply and maintain their forces under the conditions they faced.

[131][notes 18] Lieutenant Fayle, Allen's aide-de-camp, commented that: "The whole fact of the matter, and NGF seemed unable to understand all through the campaign, was that recoveries were never 100 per cent of the supplies dropped and wastage was at times terrific.

[62] While the road was improved for vehicle transport to Sonobo, about halfway from Gona to Wairopi, levies from Rabaul and pack-horses would have to carry supplies the remaining distance to Kokoda and further forward.

[185][notes 29] When the Australians commenced the advance from Imita Ridge, most battalions moving forward carried a 3-inch mortar with twenty-four bombs and one Vickers machine gun with 3,000 rounds.

[190][191] While Anderson reports that approximately 940 men were responsible for carrying the guns, ammunition and other paraphernalia across the Owen Stanleys, he concludes that, despite this burden: "Throughout the Kokoda campaign the Japanese held one distinct advantage over the Australians: artillery.

He attributes around 35 per cent of the Australian casualties to the Japanese artillery but observes that the effect upon morale was perhaps of equal significance: "The helplessness felt by the men who were subjected to relentless bombardment without the means to retaliate sapped both their number and their spirit.

The lever and striker mechanism of the Mills bomb was considered superior to their own service grenade, the Type 99, which had to be struck on a hard object to ignite the fuze immediately before throwing.

[202] MacArthur, after being ordered to leave the Philippines, arrived in Australia on 17 March 1942 and was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).

At about this time, 7th Division was deploying to New Guinea and responsibility for the immediate defence of Port Moresby, including Maroubra Force and the Kokoda Track operation was devolved to divisional headquarters under Allan.

"[228] The situation continued to simmer until it came to a head after Blamey had visited Milne Bay on 25 September at MacArthur's suggestion and ordered Clowes to send a force by air to Wanigela.

[242] On 17 October, Allen, now at Myola, received the following message from Blamey: General MacArthur considers quote extremely light casualties indicate no serious effort yet made to displace enemy unquote.

Just as the 16th Brigade was advancing on Eora Village, a signal from MacArthur through Blamey on 21 October further pressured Allen: "Operations reports show that progress on the trail is NOT repeat NOT satisfactory.

[265] Regardless of the justifications made, the sackings created a climate of suspicion, animosity, personal rivalries and a "toxic atmosphere" which pervaded the senior ranks and was detrimental to the war effort.

[327] On the approach to Isurava, the 2/14th and 39th Battalions came under increasing pressure from Japanese attacks, culminating in hand-to-hand fighting in which Private Bruce Kingsbury was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

Continuing to sweep enemy positions with his fire, and inflicting an extremely high number of casualties upon them, Private Kingsbury was then seen to fall to the ground, shot dead by the bullet from a sniper hiding in the wood.

[337] In his post-operation report, Potts noted: "At no time were 2/14th and 2/16th Australian infantry battalions ever intact and available for a concerted operation, wholly and solely due to the delays occasioned by supply.

[348][notes 39] Under mounting pressure from Allen and Rowell to make a stand, Potts determined to do so at Mission Ridge, which ran northward from Brigade Hill toward the village of Efogi.

Anderson describes what followed as being highly confused but, dawn of 24 October found the attacking force of battalion strength largely pinned down in front of the Japanese position, having suffered 34 killed and many more injured, with no prospect of success.

Lloyd then ordered the 2/3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel John Stevenson to attack down on the Japanese positions from the top of Eora Ridge (to the west) but this took two days to deploy to the forming-up point.

These attitudes and actions were motivated by a variety of factors, including a view that the Japanese were deceitful, a desire to exact revenge for atrocities against Australian military personnel and widespread racism.

[431] More recently, Australian historian Nicholas Anderson has concluded that while the Kokoda Track was a significant Allied victory, it was less important to the outcome of the Pacific War than the defeat of the main Japanese effort at this time during the Guadalcanal Campaign.