A member of the Liberal Party himself, Laake fully expressed full support for the politicians as they reduced the budgets for the Norwegian armed forces.

Quisling saw internal troubles and revolutionary activities as a clear and present threat to the state, and on several occasions in the summer of 1931 employed the military to assist the police forces.

Laake disagreed with Quisling's views on the social and political stability of Norway, and repeatedly opposed and delayed the defence minister's internal security measures.

[6] Among the anti-revolutionary measures that Laake opposed was blocking industrial labourers from serving in the Norwegian Royal Guards.

The implication was that Quisling wanted the conservative Samfundsvernet to be given an open, contra-revolutionary role as units separate from the army.

General Laake saw it as very important for the status of the military to arrest such agitators and hand them over to the police for prosecution, even though the protesters were rarely convicted in court.

[12] The army continued to have a counter-revolutionary function, and as late as November 1937 Laake approved the inclusion of mountain artillery in the units in Western Norway which were designated to deal with internal troubles.

[15] In the first months of the war, the Norwegian Army Air Service's fighter flight Jagevingen had orders not to fire at intruding aircraft.

[16] Before the outbreak of war, Laake had been one of a number of prominent Norwegians to support giving Neville Chamberlain the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the Munich Agreement with Nazi Germany in September 1938.

The same day that the British mine fields had been laid, the Polish submarine ORP Orzeł sank the German ship Rio de Janeiro that was carrying troops and war matériel off the southern Norwegian port of Lillesand.

[19] Three days earlier, on 5 April, Laake had been among some 200 prominent Norwegians to attend a party held at the German legation in Oslo.

At the party, the Germans had shown their guests from the political and military elites of Norway a dramatic propaganda film about their conquest of Poland the year before.

[21] At 2330 hours Laake was warned by chief of the general staff Rasmus Hatledal that foreign warships were intruding on Norwegian territorial waters.

[22] Before Laake could get back to Oslo minister of defence Ljungberg, the latter had left the general staff's offices to attend a cabinet meeting.

[23] In the early hours of 9 April 1940, Hatledal repeatedly attempted to get in contact with defence minister Ljungberg, and confusion reigned in the general staff as no orders from the politicians came.

No attempts were made by the general staff at preparing for mobilization by warning the telegraph offices, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, or the newspapers.

At the same time, minister of foreign affairs Halvdan Koht was reported to have said that orders for a general mobilization had been issued.

When a taxi finally arrived and brought him to Slemdal, the general staff had already evacuated to Eidsvoll without making arrangements for Laake's transport.

Laake duly walked to the nearby Slemdal station and took the Holmenkoll Line to Majorstuen to find a taxi.

During the meeting, Laake expressed his pessimistic views on the resistance against the invasion, and his disappointment at the government's decision to end negotiations with the Germans.

[29] Before the meeting in Nybergsund, Laake did not suspect that he was to be replaced, and believed he was going to give the government a briefing on the military situation.

Rasmus Hatledal, chief of the general staff, immediately requested sick leave when he heard of the dismissal of Laake, but was persuaded to stay a few days longer to help Ruge in his new position.