Kurdistan Region–Turkey relations

Turkey’s historic relationship with Iraq and Kurdistan Region has wavered between indifference and courtship, but the constant has been a layer of mistrust emanating from both ends that appears to have been set aside in 2001 when the new Turkish government reversed the status quo and embraced a policy of engagement that has successfully catapulted the country to becoming a leading economic player in the Middle East.

[1] Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in the summer of 1990 created a dilemma for Turkish foreign policy, which President Özal resolved by supporting the anti-Iraq coalition led by the United States.

Özal’s foreign policy opponents feared not only the loss of significant Iraqi trade and energy, but also the potential breakup of Iraq following an allied victory, which could catalyze the formation of an independent Kurdistan, which they feared would provide additional sanctuary for the PKK, and inspire the ethnic Kurds of southeastern Anatolia to fight for independence as well.

The return of the Iraqi Kurds to northern Iraq under protection of the US Air Force created a de facto autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq Starting with the new direction subsequently taken by Turkish foreign policy under Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey engaged in active diplomacy and economic interdependence that sought “zero problems” with Turkey's neighbors.

[5] Because the KRG’s roughly 600,000 barrels per day of oil exports are piped almost exclusively through Turkey to the port of Ceyhan, Ankara has enormous leverage not only over the region's economy, but over the resource-distribution systems underlying social stability, such as the government's ability to pay salaries.