2005 term per curiam opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States

[1] Because per curiam decisions are issued from the Court as an institution, these opinions all lack the attribution of authorship or joining votes to specific justices.

All justices on the Court at the time the decision was handed down are assumed to have participated and concurred unless otherwise noted.

Chief Justice: John Roberts Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor (retired January 31, 2006), Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito (confirmed January 31, 2006) 546 U.S. 1 Decided October 11, 2005.

The habeas petitioner's state court appellate brief clearly indicated that the federal claim had been raised in that forum.

The Court of Appeals had ruled that the habeas petition of a pro se defendant (representing himself) who was denied access to a law library during his trial should not have been dismissed.

The Court of Appeals had ruled that the habeas petitioner's conviction was contrary to Ohio law, which it claimed did not recognize transferred intent as a theory for aggravated felony murder; and that petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The District Court had dismissed an "as-applied" challenge to the prohibition of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 against the funding of "electioneering communications" from the general treasury funds of corporations, finding such challenges foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).

The Court of Appeals had ruled that the property of the Iranian Ministry of Defense could be attached by a private plaintiff under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

The Court of Appeals had reversed a verdict for Title VII plaintiffs, ruling that use of the word "boy" without qualifications or modifiers could never by itself constitute a racial slur.

The court also found insufficient plaintiffs' evidence that the defendant's explanation of its conduct was merely a pretext for racial discrimination, because it failed to "jump off the page and slap you in the face."

Although the plaintiffs were not parties to the prior state court action as the doctrine required, the District Court found that it nevertheless applied because the outcome of a government's litigation on a matter of public concern has preclusive effect over its citizens, such that the plaintiffs were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly.

This would cause the doctrine to conflict with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, because federal courts would then ignore the preclusive effects that state law would actually extend to state court decisions in favor of an exclusively federal law of preclusion.

Ginsburg filed a concurrence, joined by Souter, noting that the issue in Stevens' dissent was better determined by the District Court on remand.

Stevens filed a dissent, arguing that while the District Court erroneously decided that it lacked jurisdiction, dismissal was nevertheless correct because under Colorado state law, the issues in the suit were precluded from being relitigated.

However, the Supreme Court vacated, because the definition of "controlled substance offense" requires possession with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense, of which the defendant was not convicted.

In a rape case, the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence that was in the form of a note from one of the alleged victims.