Leo Pasvolsky
[3] In the words of Richard Holbrooke, he "was one of those figures peculiar to Washington – a tenacious bureaucrat who, fixed on a single goal, left behind a huge legacy while virtually disappearing from history.
[10] He also wrote critically about Proletkult, principally citing The Cultural Aims of the Working Class (Russian: Культурные задачи рабочего класса.
[18] The work of the Advisory Committee led to the drafting of an outline for a "preliminary UN" by Undersecretary Sumner Welles, based on the design of the League of Nations.
With the absence of Welles or any other figure with comparable influence, interest and expertise Pasvolsky's ideas and phrasing dominated the drafting henceforward.
Before Hull departed for the Moscow Conference (1943), Pasvolsky advised him that economic reconstruction, especially in the USSR, should be a prioritized, while Isaiah Bowman insisted on territorial agreements restricting Soviet expansion.
[20] In 1943 Pasvolsky was placed in charge of International Organization and Security Affairs in the State Department with responsibility for drafting the United Nations Charter; he was present at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks.
Craufurd Goodwin writes "It is striking how close a resemblance Pasvolsky's statement of objectives for the new international organization bears to the positions he had taken with Moulton throughout the previous decade.
Pasvolsky and the new Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. managed to persuade Roosevelt to drop his idea of adding Brazil as a sixth member of the Security Council.
Pasvolsky opposed an absolute veto by permanent members on all Security Council discussions and resolutions as giving these big states too much power, while Hull and the Soviets supported it.
His persistence on this issue persuaded Hull and eventually the Soviets to limit the veto to substantive matters only – not allowing it on procedural ones including discussions.
[22] The British Foreign Research and Press Service, directed by Arnold J. Toynbee, also worked on plans for postwar reconstruction and political and economic arrangements and collaborated closely with the Advisory Committee.
"[23] Pasvolsky, reflecting the thought of the State Department, the British, led by Lord Keynes and even the Soviets, envisioned the "eventual integration of Germany into the world economy."
[24] Similarly, Pasvolsky, concerned about the strain on occupation forces, favored not insisting on the removal of the Japanese emperor, opposing Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish[25] He resigned from the State Department in March 1946.
[30] Bowman's differences with Pasvolsky erupted at San Francisco, where he wrote that he was "dangerous to American interests" and that it was "a mistake to put one man with his background into a key position."
"[33] Acheson belittled Pasvolsky's postwar planning: The whole effort, except for two results, seems to have been a singularly sterile one, uninspired by gifts either of insight or prophecy.
[34] In a 1967 letter, Acheson criticized American moralism in international affairs, which he saw as culminating in "that little rat Leo Pasvolsky's United Nations."
[35] Inderjeet Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: a comparative study of The role and influence of the CFR and RIIA, 1939-1945 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
