[2] While South Africa and Portugal (until 1974) gave economic, military and limited political support to the post-UDI government,[31][32] Rhodesia was also heavily reliant on international smuggling operations, commonly referred to as "sanction-busting", in which other armaments and non-lethal military supplies were secretly purchased (often with a third country acting as broker) from West Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Israel, Brazil, Iran (until 1979), the Philippines, South Vietnam (until 1975), Taiwan, Japan, Bermuda and Grenada,[33][34] and smuggled to Rhodesia via clandestine air freighting through Oman, Iran, Gabon and the Comoros.
[35][36] Such illegally-purchased weaponry was complemented by the use of captured enemy arms and munitions late in the war, seized in the course of the Rhodesian Security Forces' own cross-border covert raids ("externals") against ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrilla bases in the neighbouring countries.
With South African technical assistance, the Rhodesians developed in coordination with the private sector their own military manufacturing capacity and began producing substitutes for items which could not be easily imported or were unaffordable in the international Black market.
By the late 1970s, Rhodesia was producing an impressive array of military hardware, including automatic firearms, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, bombs, mortars and a wide range of unique Mine and Ambush Protected (MAP) vehicles, which used commercial running gear to meet the specific requirements of the warfare being waged.
The African host countries that provided sanctuary to ZIPRA and ZANLA, mainly Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique, served as conduits for arms shipments coming from the sponsor countries, although the guerrillas themselves made use of captured enemy stocks (which included small-arms and land mines) and they were able to manufacture some of their own anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle roadside bombs and other home-made explosive devices.