In other words, the logic of appropriateness assumes that actors decide on the basis of what social norms deem right rather than what cost-benefit calculations suggest best.
[3]: 23 Put differently, actors typically follow "internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of calculation of consequences and expected utility.
The fact that a rule of action is defined as appropriate by an individual or a collectivity may reflect learning of some sort from history, but it does not guarantee moral acceptability, they explain.
[2]: 949–951 According to this rational choice perspective, rules, norms, and identities do not play any significant role in shaping human behavior.
In contrast, the logic of consequences stresses individual interests and treats political order as an aggregation of rational actor preferences through processes of bargaining, negotiation, and coalition formation.
March and Olsen, however, argue that human decision-making "generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or appropriateness.
March and Olsen stress that while rules guide behavior and make some actions more likely than others, they ordinarily do not determine decision-making or policy outcomes precisely.
In order to understand the impact of rules on action, analysts thus need to examine processes like learning, socialization, diffusion, regeneration, deliberate design, and competitive selection.
[4]: 484, 489 In his otherwise very critical review, Kjell Goldmann acknowledges that James G. March and Johan Olsen's logic of appropriateness has "inspired scholars in fields ranging from public administration to international relations."
[6]: 48 In the field of International Relations, for example, numerous scholars, especially proponents of constructivist approaches, have employed the logic of appropriateness as their action-theoretical foundation.
They have found that these institutions can play an important role in mobilizing various group socialization processes to shape states' behavior.
[7][8][9][10] Other scholars have suggested that the Chinese government, for example, has changed important aspects of its behavior as a result of socialization in the context of international organizations.
As norms strengthen, however, states presumably begin to frame behavior contradicting institutional obligations in norm-based rather than interest-based terms.
For example, Ole Jacob Sending argues that the logic of appropriateness has a structural bias both regarding the understanding and the explanation of individual action.
"[15]: 445 Kjell Goldmann criticizes that "it is difficult to determine what kind of constructs the so-called logics are – whether they are to be seen as perspectives, theories, or ideal types."
"[4]: 479 Drawing on research in neuroscience and psychology, Markwica points out that emotion plays a key role in normative action.