[9] The LRS-B was the follow-on to the Next Generation Bomber (NGB) effort, whose spiraling costs due to numerous mission additions and requirements creep caused Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to cancel the program in 2009.

On 19 May, Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz said that the USAF's focus in the 2010 budget was on "Long-range strike, not next-generation bomber" and will push for this in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

In order to make a follow-on bomber program for long-range strike politically viable, Schwartz and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley worked to ensure that it would exercise discipline in requirements definition and make greater use of proven systems and technology as well as off-board enablers to rein in costs; according to Schwartz, they also relented to Gates' insistence on ending production of the F-22 fighter aircraft to further persuade him.

By the time the research, development, and requirements processes ran their course, the aircraft, despite its great capability, turned out to be so expensive – $2 billion each in the case of the B-2 Spirit—that less than one-sixth of the planned fleet of 132 was ever built.

[16] On 11 December 2009, Gates said that the Quadrennial Defense Review had shown the need for both manned and unmanned long range strike and that the 2011 budget would likely include funding for the future bomber.

[23][24] On 6 January 2011, Gates made a speech on the U.S. defense budget for FY 2012, which announced major investment in developing a long-range, nuclear-capable bomber, also to be optionally remotely piloted.

The follow on bomber represents a key component of a joint portfolio of conventional deep-strike capabilities—an area that should be a high priority for future defense investment given the anti-access challenges our military faces.

"[25] In July 2011, Joint Chief Vice Chairman James Cartwright called for a large UAV instead of a manned aircraft, including for the nuclear mission.

[28][29] Air Force Global Strike Command indicated that one requirement for the bomber is to carry a weapon of similar effect to the Massive Ordnance Penetrator.

[32] The Obama Administration in its 2012 budget request asked for $197 million and a total of $3.7 billion over five years to develop the bomber, including modular payloads for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), electronic attack (EA), and communications.

[48] On 30 January 2014, Northrop Grumman stated their intention to invest in developing needed technology for the bomber, such as stealth designs, mission management systems, and autonomous controls.

Lt. Gen. Burton Field clarified the 80 to 100 range is due to uncertainty over the price rather than a figure representing the minimum number of bombers needed to mitigate risk.

The cost goal is to set design constraints to prevent extra requirements for capability growth desires and untested technologies that would increase the price more from being incorporated during development.

[53] Rather than the price ceiling being too low to meet requirements, the USAF sees this arrangement as itself and the potential contractor being disciplined about the bomber's missions and roles.

[55] In June 2014, the USAF revealed that the LRS-B RFP would be released "soon," with proposals to be submitted by fall 2014 and evaluations completed in early 2015, with a contract award after that.

Early aircraft will be designed around fixed requirements with mature technologies that will be adaptable through open architecture for future sensor and weapons capabilities.

[56] Although the LRS-B request for proposals (RFP) was to be released by the end of June, the USAF hesitated to publicly announce it to keep the process fair and less likely to give sensitive information to "potential adversaries".

By entering the competitive phase of acquisition, the USAF is limited with what it is able to release, and few details were expected to be made public until the contract is awarded in the second quarter of 2015.

With that stretch of time in between, the loser may be forced to leave the industry entirely; Northrop Grumman would likely not retain the infrastructure required for the next major undertaking, and Boeing's main aircraft field is now its commercial products.

[64][65] Industrial impact may cause any contract to be contested by Congress from representatives that receive campaign donations from a company whose award would create jobs for constituents.

Conducting of tests and risk reduction this early in the acquisition process is in part because the program has been handled by the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office since 2011, which has more freedom in how it procures technologies.

[78] Boeing-Lockheed Martin decided not to continue their bid protest, opting not to file suit against the Air Force in the Court of Federal Claims over the selection of Northrop Grumman.