The Supreme Court held that the publisher had attempted to monopolize trade and commerce in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and was properly enjoined from continuing its conduct.

Justice Harold H. Burton delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court that the newspaper's publisher attempted to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and was properly enjoined from continuing to do so.

"[8] The Journal sought to excuse its conduct on the ground that it has a "right as a private business concern to select its customers and to refuse to accept advertisement from whomever it pleases."

Thus the case is useful to point out again that the suppression of local competition is not free from the threat of prosecution under the Sherman Act simply because an intrastate and not an interstate monopoly is contemplated.

[10]Xharles Barber points to a contradiction or disconnect in the case law regarding specific intent in cases of this type, especially as interpreted in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,[11] the specific intent behind the refusal to deal, a purpose to eliminate a competitor or a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, was a major theme in finding a § 2 Sherman Act violation.

In Times-Picayune, the Court held that monopolization did not occur because there was no showing of specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly, and the newspaper's challenged practice was legal because it was predominantly motivated "by legitimate business aims.

[15] However, Barber insists, United States v. Griffith,[16] which is quoted in both Lorain Journal and Times-Picayune, "held that specific intent is no longer an element of the offense of monopolization under Section 2.

"[17] Barber therefore concludes: The cases reviewed above indicate that the courts are groping for an appropriate rationale of the monopoly provisions of the Sherman Act which, while limiting the freedom of a trader unduly to exploit trade advantages stemming from his market position, will assure the preservation of his essential freedom to develop his business, including his supplier and customer relationships, in accordance with his personal business judgment.

[18]Donald Turner observed in the Harvard Law Review that the Supreme Court was "unquestionably correct" in holding the conduct of the Journal as an unlawful attempt to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Moreover, the situation can be remedied, as indeed it was in Lorain Journal, by [the government's] proceeding against the instigator alone; freed of the unlawful pressures, the other parties would presumably revert to the nonrestrictive decisions they made before.