At the outbreak of World War II, Roessler was a political refugee from Bavaria who had fled to Switzerland when Hitler came to power.
He was the founder of a small publishing firm, Vita Nova Verlag, producing copies of anti-Nazi Exilliteratur and other literary works in the German language strictly banned under censorship in Nazi Germany, for smuggling across the border and black market distribution to dissident intellectuals.
[clarification needed] Thiele and Gersdorf wished him to act as a conduit for high-level military information, to be made available to him to make use of in the fight against Nazism.
This they accomplished by equipping Roessler with a radio and an Enigma machine, and designating him as a German military station (call-signed RAHS).
They were able to do this as Thiele, and his superior, Erich Fellgiebel (who was also part of the conspiracy), were in charge of the German Defence Ministry's communication centre, the Bendlerblock.
Later, seeking to aid the USSR in its role in the fight against Nazism, Roessler was able to pass on information to it via another contact who was a part of a Soviet (GRU) network run by Alexander Rado.
Though his warning was initially ignored - as Soviet intelligence had received multiple false alarms about an impending German invasion - Roessler's dates eventually proved accurate.
The Lucy spy ring came to an end in the summer of 1944 when the German members, who were also involved in other anti-Nazi activities, were arrested in the aftermath of the failed 20 July plot.
In Switzerland the Lucy network consisted of the following members: The record of messages transmitted show that Roessler had four important sources, codenamed Werther, Teddy, Olga, and Anna.
[2] Several theories can be dismissed immediately, including by Foote and several other writers, that the code names reflected the sources' access type rather than their identity- for example, that Werther stood for Wehrmacht, Olga for Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Anna for Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office)- as the evidence does not support it.
[1] They were a German major who was in charge of the Abwehr before Wilhelm Canaris, Hans Bernd Gisevius, Carl Goerdeler and a General Boelitz, who was then deceased.
[9] V. E. Tarrant echoes Knightley's objections, and in addition points out that Read and Fisher's scenario was unnecessary, as Britain was already passing Ultra information to the Soviet Union following the German invasion in June 1941.