Cadorna launched multiple offensives across the Isonzo front during which the Italian army made gradual gains, notably capturing Gorizia after counterattacking during the Strafexpedition, but suffered heavy casualties.

When Italy entered the war in May 1915 on the side of the Entente, Cadorna fielded thirty-six infantry divisions composed of 875,000 men, but with only 120 modern artillery pieces.

The goal of these offensives was the fortress of Gorizia, the capture of which would permit the Italian armies to pivot south and march on Trieste, or continue on to the Ljubljana Gap.

Cadorna's disposition of most of his troops far forward, with little defence in depth, contributed greatly to the Defeat at Caporetto;[6] but graver still were the responsibilities of other officers, notably Pietro Badoglio, then corps commander in a sector overrun by the Austro-German attack.

Italy's allies Britain and France insisted on the dismissal of Cadorna[7] (the General was relieved of command on 9 November 1917[8]) and sent eleven divisions to reinforce the Italian front.

David Stevenson, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, describes him as earning "opprobrium as one of the most callous and incompetent of First World War commanders.

[14] However, the military historian John Keegan records that his "judicial savagery" took the form of the summary executions of individual stragglers rather than the formalized winnowing of entire detachments.

[15][Note 1] Because of the multiple and consecutive failed attacks led by him, the large number of casualties incurred among his own men, and his personal reputation as disproportionately bitter and ruthless, Cadorna is often considered one of the worst generals of World War I.

[10][16] Other historians have a more balanced view of Cadorna, taking into account the fact that he was held in high regard by allied and enemy generals prior to the battle of Caporetto.

They argue that, in terms of military tactics, he was a typical general of his generation, his numerous offensives being decided together with Allied commanders as part of an overall strategy to wear out Austro-German forces while simultaneous battles were occurring in the Western and Eastern fronts.

The disaster of Caporetto has been explained with the arrival of superior German forces to the Austrian front, believed to be about to collapse following the eleventh Isonzo offensive (battle of Bainsizza) in 1917.