On 6 November 2002, the aircraft operating the flight, a Fokker 50 registered as LX-LGB, lost control and crashed onto a field during an attempted landing at the airport.

The maintenance logbook indicated that the last defect, an inoperative anti-skid system on the aircraft, had been rectified on 5 November, one day before the accident.

On 6 November, the aircraft was scheduled to take off from Tempelhof and would be piloted by Captain Claude Poeckes and his co-pilot First Officer John Arendt.

They either had to wait until the weather condition began to improve by entering the holding pattern or diverting their aircraft to the alternate airport.

[3] While First Officer Arendt was giving an address to the passengers, Captain Poeckes tried to contact Luxair officials on whether the weather had improved as a departing Cargolux jet might have cleared some of the fog in the area.

Due to the constant foggy condition, the crew were told to enter the Diekrich VOR, Findel's holding pattern.

Co-pilot Arendt then announced to the passengers that the flight would enter a holding pattern first and that they would wait until the weather began to improve.

Fearing that they had been asked to prepare for an approach, they repeatedly checked the RVR (Runway Visual Range) value with Luxair Dispatch, but the weather in Findel Airport was still below the minimum amount for the landing.

After successfully capturing the airport's ILS, the crew checked on the RVR again, only to discover that the weather had deteriorated even further.

[3] After extending the landing gear, the propeller speed began to increase, startling the crew due to the audible noise.

In an attempt to regain lift, First Officer Arendt immediately retracted the flaps and Captain Poeckes moved the thrust lever fully forward.

Its blip had disappeared from the radar screen, prompting the controller to call the crew multiple times to confirm their condition.

[8] It was immediately found that the aircraft had crashed in a field 700 metres (2,300 ft; 770 yd) to the north of runway centreline.

The crew were worried with the discovery as it was under the minimum amount for Fokker F50 and decided to wait within the holding pattern until the weather began to improve.

Coincidentally, Flight 9642 was the most suitable for such decision as they had not reached the holding pattern yet and by asking the crew to conduct an approach there would be lesser delay for the other aircraft.

They were initially certain that they were going to wait within the holding pattern, but the sudden transmission from the controller effectively cut their remaining time until landing.

They quickly checked their checklist and hastily briefed the approach, in which during the course they accidentally missed some of the per procedure actions due to their time constraint.

[3]: 55–56 Feeling uncertain with the approach, Captain Poeckes told First Officer Arendt that they would perform a go-around if the RVR was still below the minima.

Captain Poeckes eventually called for a go-around, but after an updated RVR report informed him that the weather had met the exact minimum for a landing, he immediately changed his mind and decided to continue the approach.

To prevent an accidental deployment of the reverse range, the aircraft was equipped with a secondary stop, a specific safety feature which was regulated by the flight idle solenoid.

The brief glitch powered up the flight idle solenoids and tricked them into thinking that the aircraft was rolling on the runway, causing them to temporarily open the secondary stop feature for 16 seconds.

The electromagnetic interference occurred and this in turn energized the flight idle solenoids, opening the secondary stop.

The cause of the glitch was identified during maintenance activities in which the power-up effect of the aircraft's anti-skid system was found to be the culprit.

For the reset to occur, these conditions had to be met: In December 1994, Fokker disseminated the findings to all operators of the aircraft, including Luxair.

In 1992, a non-binding service bulletin was issued, telling operators to transport their Fokker F50 fleets for a voluntary modification on their anti-skid units, which would prevent such failure from occurring.

It led the crew to perform a series of improvised actions that ended in the prohibited override of the primary stop on the power levers and leading to an irreversible loss of control.

[3]Contributing to the accident were errors concerning the implementation of a safety recommendation which had been made by the manufacturer to Fokker 50 operators.

Nearly two weeks after the crash, following the discovery of the failure of the secondary stop safety feature to prevent the thrust from entering the reverse range, authorities decided to change the issued service bulletins regarding the anti-skid units from voluntary to mandatory.

Captain Poeckes, three former Luxair executives, and three mechanics (one of whom was formally a technical director) were all charged with involuntary manslaughter and negligence.

[24] The accident will be featured in season 25, episode 4 of the Canadian documentary series Mayday, titled "Second Thoughts".