[2][7] By 1894, the U.S. Navy desired to adopt a modern small-bore, smokeless powder rifle in keeping with other first-line naval powers.

[2][8] The rifle action was required to withstand the firing of five overpressure (proof) cartridges with a chamber pressure of 60,000 psi (410 MPa).

Luger's submission had only one major disadvantage: it failed to meet government specifications, having been chambered in a non-standard rimless 6mm cartridge.

[9] The Lee turning bolt design was considered to be a good one, but marred by its magazine system, which the Small Arms Board found to be problematic.

[9] Apparently this never came to pass, as Luger not only declined to submit its design in the Navy's government 6mm chambering, but withdrew from the third round of the service trials.

[4][11] However, deliveries of the initial shipment of 10,000 rifles were not completed until 1897, owing to delays caused by manufacturing issues, as well as contract changes imposed by the navy.

[3] Beginning in 1898, during the Marine expeditionary campaign in Cuba, reports emerged from the field criticizing the floating extractor design.

[3][4][11] Unlike the M1892 Springfield (Krag) and the later M1903 Springfield rifle, the Lee straight-pull did not have a magazine cut-off to enable the cartridges in the magazine to be held in reserve in keeping with the prevailing small arms military doctrine of the day (for use in rapid-fire, close-range combat only, fed single rounds the rest of the time).

[2][4] This conclusion was in conflict with the Naval Small Arms Board, which did consider the Lee clip to be an essential part of the magazine.

[9] When specifying the requirements for its new service rifle, the Navy emphasized that it desired a repeating rifle loaded by means of chargers or clips, but "since the conditions of service may require the use of loose cartridges, or may result in the disabling of the magazine, it is desirable that the small arm be susceptible of use as a single loader, and that the magazine be capable of being replenished by single cartridges.

Once the rather odd "up and back" bolt movement was mastered, and as long as the action was clean and well-lubricated, it worked fairly well, though the slightly inclined opening stroke proved awkward for some men when the rifle was operated from the shoulder.

[4][22] Because of the 6mm cartridge's flat trajectory and resultant increased danger zone when firing at enemy personnel (compared to prior service rifles), the Navy had originally expressed interest in a fixed rear sight for the M1895.

[8] However, in the end the M1895 was fitted with a ladder-type rear sight adjustable for elevation to a maximum of 2,000 yards, determined by actual firing at Winchester in March 1896.

[12][23] Because of the relatively high velocity and flat trajectory of the 6mm Lee cartridge, authorities calibrated the sights at their lowest setting with a point-blank or dead aim range of 725 yards (663 m).

Owing to the necessity of supplying the Navy with rifles as soon as practicable, no provision for drift (windage) was included in the rear sight.

[12] At the insistence of the Naval Small Arms Board, the finalized Lee rifle was equipped with a firing-pin lock on the left side of the receiver, which acted as a safety.

[4] Contemporary reports and subsequent tests indicate that the M1895 and its ammunition were exceedingly accurate: target groups approaching a minute of angle at 100 yards were not unusual with individual rifles.

[28] The original 6mm ball loading was supplied by Winchester, and used a roundnosed, cupro-nickeled steel-jacketed lead-core bullet with a total weight of 135 grains.

[30][31] Besides providing increased velocity and a flatter trajectory, the primary reason for the change in cartridge and bullet design was to reduce chamber pressures and extend the life of the rifle barrel: the new 112-grain loading with its copper-jacketed bullet gave an average barrel life of 10,000 rounds as opposed to only 3,000 for the 135-grain steel-jacketed load.

[33] Intended primarily for shipboard use against enemy naval forces in small boats, the 6mm Lee had considerably more penetrating power than the U.S. Army's .30 Army (.30-40 Krag) cartridge, and could perforate 23 inches (58 cm) of soft wood at 700 yards (640 m), a single 3⁄8 inch (9.5 mm) thick steel boiler plate at 100 feet (30 m), or a 0.276 in (7.0 mm) plate of chromium steel (no backing) at 150 feet.

[2][31] These problems were exacerbated by the custom of keeping ammunition aboard ship for long periods under conditions of high heat and humidity.

[20][41] Surviving examples seen of the confirmed Maine rifles have pitted receivers, which would be logical considering the salt water immersion in Havana Harbor.

[36][42][43] During a four-day call at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and later during a two-week stopover at Key West, Florida Lt. Col. Huntington ensured that all enlisted Marines aboard the USS Panther underwent target practice on the beaches with the Lee rifle, as well as marksmanship training and small-unit battle drills.

[36][43] This last-minute opportunity for target practice and training proved fortuitous, as Cuban guerrillas later handed Lee rifles had some initial difficulty operating and using them, while Lt. Col. Huntington's Marines had no such problems.

[36][43] The first major combat use of the M1895 occurred during the land campaign to capture Guantánamo Bay, Cuba from June 9–14, 1898 with the First Marine Battalion (Reinforced), in particular at the battles of Camp McCalla and Cuzco Wells.

[36][42][43] Though some problems were noted with the new rifle,[18] the flat ballistics,[26] accuracy and rate of fire of the M1895 and the light weight of its 6mm ammunition proved to be of considerable benefit during offensive infantry operations over mountainous and jungled terrain against both Spanish regulars and loyalist guerrilla forces.

cartridge, believing the latter to have inadequate shocking or stopping power against frenzied bolo-wielding Moro juramentados, who attacked from jungle cover at extremely close distances.

[46][47] In this situation, the 6mm Lee bullet may have overpenetrated without causing sufficient shock and trauma to the enemy, a situation which the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Ordnance had foreseen as early as 1895, when he acknowledged the concern that "the wounds produced by small-caliber bullets will frequently not be sufficient to put the wounded out of action and their shock will not stop the onset of excited men at short range".