The operation is notable for the Japanese use of bicycle infantry, which allowed troops to carry more equipment and swiftly move through thick jungle terrain.

The Japanese considered that pulling out of China would result in a loss of face and decided instead to take military action against US, British and Dutch territories in South East Asia.

The British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility, in order to defend both Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia.

[23] Military planners concluded that the desired Malayan air force strength would be 300–500 aircraft, but this was never reached because of the higher priorities in the allocation of men and material for Britain and the Middle East.

[25] Through the operation of these networks prior to the invasion the Japanese knew where the Commonwealth forces were based and their unit strengths, had good maps of Malaya, and had local guides available to provide them with directions.

[28] The Japanese forces held a slight advantage in numbers in northern Malaya and were significantly superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics, and experience, having fought in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The Japanese also used bicycle infantry and light tanks, which allowed swift movement of their forces overland through terrain covered with thick tropical rainforest, criss-crossed by native paths.

Although the Japanese had not brought bicycles with them (to speed the disembarkation process), they knew from their intelligence that suitable machines were plentiful in Malaya and quickly confiscated what they needed from civilians and retailers.

[35] The Genzen Air Group was a key participant in the sinking of the British capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse off the coast of Malaya on 10 December 1941, losing one aircraft and its crew during the battle.

[citation needed] The squadrons were beset by numerous problems including inadequate spare parts and a lack of support staff, airfields that were difficult to defend against air attack with no early warning of impending attacks, a lack of a clear and coherent command structure, a Japanese spy in the Army air liaison staff (Heenan), and antagonism between RAF and RAAF squadrons and personnel.

A counter tactic of avoiding dog fights with a 'slash and run' attack was developed by Lieutenant-General Claire Lee Chennault of the Flying Tigers but was too late for the Allied pilots serving in this campaign.

[42][43] Two days before the attack on Malaya, Hudsons of No 1 Squadron RAAF spotted the Japanese invasion fleet but, given uncertainty about the ships' destination and instructions to avoid offensive operations until attacks were made against friendly territory, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief of British Far East Command, did not allow the convoy to be bombed.

However, the appearance of ever greater numbers of Japanese fighters, including markedly superior types such as the Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscar" soon overwhelmed the Buffalo pilots, both in the air and on the ground.

[47][48] Continued Japanese dominance eventually forced both Squadrons back to Singapore on 24 December, where they were merged until more replacement aircraft could be obtained.

[49] The Genzan Air Group sank Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10 December, which also established Japanese naval supremacy.

[51] On 25 December, the Second division of Squadron 5, Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Force was deployed to Singapore, contributing to the Allied cause before being recalled to Java on 18 January.

Several Dutch pilots—including Jacob van Helsdingen and August Deibel—responded to a number of air raids over Singapore while stationed at Kallang Airport.

[citation needed] On 3 January 1942, 51 disassembled Hurricane Mk IIBs arrived in Singapore along with 24 pilots (many of whom were veterans of the Battle of Britain) who had been transferred to there with the intention of forming the nucleus of five squadrons.

The following day 453 squadron provided an escort of eight aircraft for five Wirraways and four NEI Glenn Martin bombers, attacking Japanese troops on the Maur River.

[citation needed] Aircraft from 36, 62, and 100 Squadrons unsuccessfully attacked the Japanese invasion fleet at Endau on 26 January, suffering heavy losses.

[citation needed] It is not entirely clear how many Japanese aircraft the Buffalo squadrons shot down, although RAAF pilots alone managed to shoot down at least 20.

[39] The Hawker Hurricane, which fought in Singapore alongside the Buffalo from 20 January, also suffered severe losses from ground attack; most were destroyed.

It was a response to an order from British High Command which had come to the conclusion that Penang should be abandoned as it had no tactical or strategic value in the rapidly changing military scheme of things at that time.

At the same time, Thailand officially signed a Treaty of Friendship with Imperial Japan, which completed the formation of their loose military alliance.

[64] At the Battle of Slim River, in which two Indian brigades were practically annihilated, the Japanese used surprise and tanks to devastating effect in a risky night attack.

[65] By mid-January, the Japanese had reached the southern Malayan state of Johore where, on 14 January, they encountered troops from the Australian 8th Division, commanded by Major-General Gordon Bennett, for the first time in the campaign.

[66] Led by Australian Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Anderson, the surviving Indian and Australian troops formed the "Muar Force" and fought a desperate four-day withdrawal,[66] allowing remnants of the Commonwealth troops withdrawing from northern Malaya to avoid being cut off and to push past the Japanese to safety.

When the Muar Force reached the bridge at Parit Sulong and found it to be firmly in enemy hands, Anderson, with mounting numbers of dead and wounded, ordered "every man for himself".

[citation needed] In less than two months, the Battle for Malaya had ended in comprehensive defeat for the Commonwealth forces and their retreat from the Malay Peninsula to the fortress of Singapore.

On 13 February, five days after the invasion of Singapore Island, and with Japanese forces approaching the city centre, he was taken by military police to the waterside and was hastily executed.