However, Buthelezi was derided in some quarters for participating in the bantustan system, a central pillar of apartheid, and for his moderate stance on such issues as free markets, armed struggle, and international sanctions.

This proposal did not take hold and Buthelezi became aggrieved by what he perceived as the growing marginalisation both of the IFP and of himself personally, as negotiations were increasingly dominated by the ANC, and the white National Party government.

The 1972 KwaZulu constitution vested all executive powers in Buthelezi and granted the Zulu king a largely ceremonial role, requiring him to "hold himself aloof from party politics and sectionalism".

[21][35] According to Buthelezi, adopting the name Inkatha had been the suggestion of Bishop Alphaeus Zulu, who hoped that an emphasis on cultural matters might protect the organisation from being banned by the apartheid government.

[35] Buthelezi said that the idea had been born on a visit to Lusaka, Zambia, in 1974, when Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, "speaking on behalf of the Frontline States", had "urged me to found a membership-based organisation to reignite political mobilisation" in South Africa and to create "a cohesive force".

[50] In 1982, Buthelezi led a political and legal battle to block the government from carrying out a proposed land deal, which would have seen the region of Ingwavuma in northern KwaZulu – from the Mozambican border in the west to the Indian Ocean coast in the east – ceded to neighbouring Swaziland.

[54] Allister Sparks said it was "the first time in memory" that "black South Africans have forced the white segregationist government to back down on a major issue involving the ideology of apartheid or racial separation".

Archbishop Desmond Tutu famously asked Buthelezi to leave the funeral of Robert Sobukwe in 1978 because supporters of the Pan Africanist Movement objected fiercely to his presence, throwing stones at him and calling him a "sell-out" and "government stooge".

'[31]Buthelezi's admirers point out that he initially, and skilfully,[35] resisted the central government's plan to implement separate development in KwaZulu, taking an "intransigent" stance that set him apart from the leaders of other black areas.

[15][35] In 1985, after the relationship had deteriorated, Tambo said that the ANC leadership had agreed to the formation of Inkatha in 1975 in the hope that Buthelezi could lead mass anti-apartheid mobilisation through the legal avenues available to politicians in the bantustan system.

[68] He opposed the armed struggle and the student protests, consumer boycotts, and union strikes that dominated grassroots anti-apartheid organising in that period under the United Democratic Front (UDF).

[89] Among other things, Inkatha recruits were trained by special forces in the use of Soviet weapons, heavy duty weapons including mortars and RPG-7s; explosives, land mines, and hand grenades; and techniques for "attacks on houses with aim of killing all the occupants", as occurred in the 1988 Trust Feed massacre; once operational, the recruits also received assistance from South African Police officers who attempted to ensure that arrested Caprivi trainees obtained bail and were released.

[93] Mandela's release from prison in February 1990 coincided with the unbanning of the ANC and other black political organisations, and marked the beginning of the final, most substantive stage of the negotiations which ended apartheid in 1994.

[21] In 1990, Buthelezi claimed that the IFP had 1.9 million paid members, which would make it the largest party in South Africa,[8] and he expected it to play a major role in the negotiations and ultimate settlement.

[96] By the 1980s, Buthelezi was a consistent advocate for political reforms instituting a federal system in South Africa, generally incorporating recognition for racial and ethnic identities – though from 1980 also including a common national citizenship and freedom of movement between regions[35] – and therefore sometimes described as a form of consociationalism.

During the negotiations on constitutional principles in 1991–1993, Buthelezi and the IFP continued to advocate for a federal system with a high degree of devolved regional autonomy and strong guarantees for the representation of minority interests, including the status of Zulu traditional leaders.

[106] Although he walked back his threat and the IFP did participate in the next stage of talks at the MPNF, COSAG continued to act as a lobbying group, aiming to ensure that its members were not sidelined or played off against each other, as they believed they had been in the past, and to promote a united front in advocating for the broad principles of federalism and political self-determination.

[106] Rejecting the call to delay, the ANC and NP offered Buthelezi additional constitutionally guarantees of the status of the Zulu monarchy and a process of post-election international mediation to resolve remaining disagreements about regional autonomy.

[112] The ballot papers for the election had already been printed, so the IFP's name – with the picture of Buthelezi, its presidential candidate – was added by means of a sticker attached manually to the bottom of each slip.

[128][129] This was partly facilitated by the establishment of the Ingonyama Trust, which had been set up just before the 1994 election as a result of negotiations between the NP and the IFP; it reduced the king's direct financial dependence on the local political authority formerly headed by Buthelezi.

[131] That weekend, Buthelezi presided over Shaka Day services held without the king for the first time ever;[132] in his speech, he surprised observers by rejecting the concept of a sovereign Zulu state with an executive monarch.

Fellow Zulus Jacob Zuma and Ben Ngubane reportedly acted as government emissaries in attempting to mediate between them, including by trying to persuade Zwelithini to reinstate Buthelezi's premiership.

[139] The 1999 general election proceeded in terms of the final Constitution without any formal provision for power-sharing, but Mbeki, who became Mandela's successor as president, chose informally to extend the Government of National Unity by maintaining IFP representation in his cabinet.

[6] Buthelezi continued to deny that he had ever "ordered, ratified or condoned human rights violations" and launched a lengthy legal battle to force the Commission to open its records to him and change its report.

[149] However, Mbeki and Penuell Maduna, the Minister of Justice, had a range of complaints about the regulations, including that they were unconstitutional, established unduly lax immigration standards, would cause "administrative chaos", and had not yet been discussed and agreed to by the rest of the cabinet.

It would also be unkind of me on an occasion such as this one, to mention the low moments and the times when I felt that this Cabinet or my own president was unfair with me, or not sufficiently confident in my competence, expertise and good faith in the exercising of my ministerial functions.

The document was highly critical of the party's trajectory, describing it as having had "no vision, no mission or philosophical base, no clear national ambitions or direction and no articulated ideological basis" since around 1987, and as having become "increasingly reactionary, defensive and internalised", prone to "a persecution- and conspiracy-dominated analysis".

[162] In January 2011, when Magwaza-Msibi left the IFP to form the National Freedom Party, the Daily Maverick observed, "The revolt seems to be inspired by the old complaint that Mangosuthu Buthelezi... refuses to hand power over to anyone.

In subsequent years, it also appeared that Buthelezi might retire from his position as traditional prime minister – although he became heavily involved in the royal family's succession battle in 2021 and 2022 after King Goodwill Zwelithini died in March 2021.

[184] The political cartoonist Zapiro, speaking from personal experience, described him as "the most litigious politician in South Africa";[185] he fought a long-running battle to discredit Mzala Nxumalo after he wrote a critical biography of Buthelezi, Chief With a Double Agenda, in 1988.