The visit continued to Germany where he attended the Nuremberg rally and met Adolf Hitler, with whom the prince tried to boost relations, following the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936.

[citation needed] With the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Homma was appointed commander of the IJA 27th Division in China from 1938 to 1940 and directed the blockade of the foreign concessions in Tientsin, where he led the negotiations with the British.

In one instance, on his approach to Manila, Homma stopped his columns and ordered the men to clean up and tighten formations, believing that unkempt soldiers are more likely to loot and rape.

[6] His approach towards Filipino civilians earned him the enmity of his superior, General Count Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, who sent adverse reports about Homma to Tokyo from his headquarters in Saigon.

[7] Homma failed to give credence to the possibility that a retreat into the Bataan Peninsula by Filipino-American forces might succeed in upsetting the Japanese timetable.

By the time he recognized his mistake, his best infantry division had been replaced by a poorly trained reserve brigade, greatly weakening his assault force.

[This quote needs a citation] Worried about the stalled offensive in Luzon, Hirohito pressed Army Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama twice in January 1942 to increase troop strength and launch a quick knockout on Bataan.

The prosecution called witnesses and filed depositions attesting to the abuse and poor conditions encountered by the Allied soldiers during the march.

[9] During his defense, Homma claimed that he was so preoccupied with the plans for the Corregidor assault that he had forgotten about the prisoners' treatment, believing that his officers were properly handling the matter.

[14] After American–Filipino forces surrendered the Bataan Peninsula, Homma turned the logistics of handling the estimated 25,000 prisoners to Major General Yoshitake Kawane.

[18]Homma's chief defense counsel, John H. Skeen Jr., stated that it was a "highly irregular trial, conducted in an atmosphere that left no doubt as to what the ultimate outcome would be".

General Arthur Trudeau, a member of the five-member tribunal that condemned Homma, said in a 1971 interview,There's no question but that some men who were either weak or wounded were shot or bayoneted on this Death March.

[20]General Douglas MacArthur had a differing conclusion and wrote in his review of the case: If this defendant does not deserve his judicial fate, none in jurisdictional history ever did.