Massive retaliation

[1] It stated that, in order to defend against Soviet aggression, the U.S. required "a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power."

Massive retaliation was part of Eisenhower's broader New Look national security policy, which attempted to balance a healthy economy with military strength.

[1] The idea of massive retaliation sparked public controversy[2] in a speech by Eisenhower administration Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on January 12, 1954: We need allies and collective security.

[3]Although Dulles did not explicitly use the words "massive retaliation,"[2] his speech created the impression that any amount of Soviet aggression might provoke the US into total nuclear war.

[4] However, no decision was made by the Eisenhower administration to rely exclusively on the threat of strategic nuclear bombing,[4] as demonstrated by its flexible responses to various crises such as in Indochina, the Taiwan Strait, Suez, and Lebanon.

"[3] Similarly, Bernard Brodie noted that Dulles's doctrine "reflected a characteristically military dissatisfaction, one made familiar previously in the MacArthur hearings."

[6] In theory, as the Soviet Union had no desire to provoke an all-out nuclear attack, the policy of massive response likely deterred any ambitions it would have had on Western Europe.

In fact, the Soviet Union took many minor military actions that would have necessitated the use of nuclear weapons under a strict reading of the massive retaliation doctrine.

Still, if both sides of a conflict adopt the same stance of massive response, it may result in unlimited escalation (a "nuclear spasm"), each believing that the other will back down after the first round of retaliation.

"[9] President John F. Kennedy abandoned the policy of massive retaliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis in favor of flexible response.

Under the Kennedy Administration, the United States adopted a more flexible policy in an attempt to avert nuclear war if the Soviets did not cooperate with American demands.

Thomas Schelling's deterrence theory discusses this more sharply: "signalling", or the use of threats to intentionally deter an enemy from an attack or to make demands.