[6] However, that portion of the law was not enforced,[7] and the Montana Board of Medical Examiners issued regulations permitting physician assistants to perform abortions.

[13] Abortion-rights advocates claimed the law was an unconstitutional attempt to target Cahill, while Racicot argued that it aimed to protect women's health.

[16] They moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the law violated the U.S. Constitution because it was intended to create an undue burden on abortion rights.

[17] On September 29, 1995, Judge Paul G. Hatfield denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the law was likely constitutional and that the balance of hardships did not weigh sufficiently in the plaintiffs' favor.

Oral argument was heard on February 28, 1996, before Circuit Judges Harry Pregerson, William C. Canby Jr., and Michael Daly Hawkins.

[22] The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on January 13, 1997, asking the Supreme Court to hear the case and to reverse the Ninth Circuit's ruling.

[23] The plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition on March 28, 1997, and the justices considered the petition at six consecutive private conferences between April and June of that year.

[27] Writing that "we do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent...when the results are harmless," the Court argued that the Ninth Circuit had erred by imputing bad faith to the legislature.

[30] Finding the proper outcome obvious, the Court found no need for oral argument and instead ended its opinion by granting the petition for certiorari, reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanding for further proceedings.

[35] Finally, Stevens argued that the case involved an "extremely narrow issue" pertinent only to Montana and unworthy of the Court's review.

The president of the pro-life group Americans United for Life praised the ruling as "a significant public health victory," while the head of the pro-choice Center for Reproductive Law and Policy denounced it as "a devastating acceptance of discrimination against abortion providers.

[45] One scholar has written that, due to Mazurek, "proving [illicit legislative] intent to the Court's satisfaction has proven virtually impossible in practice.

[45][47] Another analyst has argued that "the decision in Mazurek continues the gradual deterioration of the holding in Roe v. Wade, as the Supreme Court demonstrates disfavor toward the right to obtain an abortion.

"[48] The Court's decision has been understood to permit regulations that require mifepristone pills, used to facilitate medication abortions, to be dispensed in person by doctors.