The Ohio Elections Commission fined McIntyre $100 for violating a state law that prohibited the distribution of any kind of political or campaign literature that does not have the name and address of the person responsible for its contents.

The Court's majority opinion emphasized the importance of anonymous speech, describing it as "not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent".

[4][5] However, in Talley v. California (1960), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a similar Los Angeles city ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafletting was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment.

[9] Applying a standard of exacting scrutiny, the Court determined that the government's interest in providing the electorate with information about campaign contributions outweighed the First Amendment concerns in the case of Buckley.

In a divided vote, the majority of the judges felt bound by the precedent set in State v. Babst (1922) by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which upheld the "statutory predecessor" of section 3599.09(A).

The majority of the state supreme court justices felt that the Ohio statute was different from the city ordinance in Talley, finding that section 3599.09(A) "has as its purpose the identification of persons who distribute materials containing false statements".

[16] In a dissenting opinion, Justice J. Craig Wright wrote that section 3599.09(A) "'is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and is, therefore, unconstitutional as applied to McIntyre.

[15][18][19] Justice Stevens later wrote, "Even though the amount in controversy is only $100", the Court's grant of certiorari "reflects our agreement with [the executor's] appraisal of the importance of the question presented".

[20] Stevens emphasized that the First Amendment protects a right to anonymity, referring to Talley as precedent,[21] and stated that Ohio's interests in preventing fraud and informing the electorate were insufficient to justify the sweeping scope of its statute.

Stevens began his First Amendment analysis by quoting Talley v. California, where the Court wrote: "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.

"[24] Stevens noted various well-known authors throughout literary history who had opted to publish either anonymously or under a pseudonym, including Mark Twain, O. Henry, Benjamin Franklin, and Voltaire.

[31] Specifically, Ohio must demonstrate that its stated interests "in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements" and "in providing the electorate with relevant information" are sufficient to justify its law against anonymous campaign literature.

[32] Stevens stated that the interest of "informing the electorate" is "plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement", writing that "the identity of the speaker is no different from other components of the document's content that the author is free to include or exclude".

[b][34] On the other hand, Stevens acknowledged that the fraud and libel prevention interest "carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large".

With respect to Bellotti, Stevens clarified that "although we commented in dicta on the prophylactic effect of requiring identification of the source of corporate advertising, that footnote did not necessarily apply to independent communications by an individual like Mrs.

[20] Thomas agreed with the majority opinion that the Ohio law prohibiting anonymous campaign literature was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment, but would have applied "a different methodology to this case".

[41] After analyzing historical evidence, Thomas concluded that the original intent of the First Amendment included a protection of anonymous speech and criticized the majority for adopting "an analysis that is largely unconnected to the Constitution's text and history".

[53] Responding to Norton's claim, Amy Constantine wrote in a Connecticut Law Review article that "McIntyre nonetheless is an important decision that recognizes a de minimis exception to campaign literature disclosure statutes".

[59] Grabow criticized the Court's decision, arguing that "the majority opinion fails to fully consider Ohio's strong interests in preventing fraudulent campaign-related statements and providing information to its electorate".

[65] However, Dupree qualified that statement by saying that the "precise scope of McIntyre is far from clear" and that "the Court offered little guidance as to the decision's applicability to statutes that regulate a narrower class of speakers—such as candidates for political office—or a communications medium other than print".

[68] In an article published in the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, legal scholar Richard Briffault commented that even though McIntyre invalidated a disclosure law on constitutional grounds, the decision did not undermine "the Court's general support for the public dissemination of campaign finance information".

[77] Strickland compared McIntyre to two subsequent cases, both concerning requests for a process called "expedited discovery", by which a court can attempt to "facilitate efforts to identify and to serve an unknown defendant".

According to Strickland, "The court noted the factual distinctions of McIntyre, yet stated that its general principle – that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech – nevertheless applied".